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ANALYSIS OF DRIVER’S LICENSE 
SUSPENSION IN NORTH CAROLINA 
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ABSTRACT 
A person’s interest in a driver’s license is “substantial,” and as the 
U.S. Supreme Court has observed, the suspension of a license by the 
state can result in “inconvenience and economic hardship suffered,” 
including because a license may be “essential in the pursuit of a 
livelihood.” However, forty-four U.S. states currently require indefinite 
suspension of driver’s licenses for non-driving-related reasons, such as 
failure to appear in court or pay fines for traffic infractions. There are 
no systematic, peer-reviewed analyses of individual-level or county-
level data regarding such suspensions. This study describes North 
Carolina’s population of suspended drivers and assesses how driver’s 
license suspension statutes operate relative to geography, race, and 
poverty level. First, it analyzes four decades of active-suspension data 
in North Carolina and finds over 1,225,000 active suspensions for 
failures to appear or pay traffic fines, amounting to one in seven adult 
drivers in the state. Second, it compares these data to county-population 
data; county-level traffic-stop data, collected as required by statute in 
North Carolina; and county-level data on the volume and composition 
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of traffic court dockets. This study reveals that driver’s license 
suspensions are not associated with either the volume of traffic stops or 
the size of the traffic court docket. In contrast, we find that black and 
Latinx people are overrepresented relative to the population. Linear 
mixed-level modeling regression analyses demonstrate that the 
population of white people below the poverty line and black people 
above the poverty line are most strongly associated with more 
suspensions. Finally, this Article explores implications of these results 
for efforts to reconsider the imposition of driver’s license suspensions 
for non-driving-related reasons. These patterns raise constitutional 
concerns and practical challenges for policy efforts to undo such large-
scale suspension of driving privileges. 
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INTRODUCTION
“I was only going like 3 mph over the speed limit,” said a Durham, 
North Carolina resident.1 The fine, though, was for hundreds of 
dollars.2 “I just couldn’t afford it. I have four kids.”3 He lost his driver’s 
license, an automatic consequence for failure to pay traffic fines in 
North Carolina, which in turn impacted his housing and employment.4 
But now, based on a collaborative effort in the city, he had the court 
debt forgiven and his license restored: “It means the world . . . . I’m 
employed, I’m able to go spend quality time with my kids.”5 One out 
of five Durham residents have a suspended or revoked driver’s license, 
and there are tens of thousands more in the city who suffer the 
consequences of traffic fines and fees.6 
A person’s interest in a driver’s license is “substantial,” and as the 
U.S. Supreme Court has observed, the suspension of a license by the 
state can result in “inconvenience and economic hardship suffered,”7 
especially because a license may “become essential in the pursuit of a 
livelihood.”8 A suspended license can result in negative consequences 
ranging from job loss, to restricted career opportunities, to limited 
mobility, to name a few.9 However, until recently, all fifty states and 
the District of Columbia had in place laws that permit driver’s licenses 
to be suspended or withdrawn for non-driving-related reasons, 
 1. Sarah Krueger, Durham Program Offers Second Chance to NC Drivers with Suspended, 
Revoked License, WRAL.COM (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.wral.com/durham-program-offers-
second-chance-to-nc-drivers-with-suspended-revoked-license/18255320 [https://perma.cc/WGV7-
WBR2].
 2. Id. 
3. Id.
 4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id.
7. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10–11, 19 (1979) (finding, in light of the due-process-
protected property interest in a driver’s license, that a state hearing process was adequate for 
contesting a license suspension for refusal to take a blood-alcohol breath-analysis test). 
8. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (“Once [driver’s] licenses are issued . . . their 
continued possessionmay become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. . . . [L]icenses are not 
to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
9. See ALICIA BANNON, MITALI NAGRECHA & REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUST., CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 2, 24–29 (2010), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines%20FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S9PW-4CUY] (noting that states, including North Carolina, “suspend driving 
privileges for missed debt payments, a practice that can make it impossible for people to work 
and that can lead to new convictions for driving with a suspended license”); ALEXES HARRIS, A
POUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS PUNISHMENT FOR THE POOR 50–51 (2016) 
(discussing the detrimental consequences of nonpayment).
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including failure to comply with child-support orders, failure to 
maintain proper insurance, failure to appear in court or pay fines for 
vehicular violations, and many others.10 In recent years, due to legal 
challenges and legislative change, several jurisdictions have removed 
such consequences.11 However, forty-four U.S. states still require 
suspension of driver’s licenses for non-driving-related reasons— 
indefinitely in thirty-nine states.12 Policies related to failure to pay 
traffic fines or appear in court are not designed primarily to promote 
public safety, but rather to use suspension to induce payment and 
compliance.13 In that context, driver’s license suspension is a state-
employed debt-collection tool. Existing data suggests that at least 
eleven million Americans, and perhaps far more, have suspended 
licenses.14 However, prior research findings are largely limited to four 
states and descriptive analyses.15 Here, we expand our understanding 
of license suspensions by studying a new state, North Carolina, and 
modeling how race and poverty predict suspensions. 
This study is the first to examine comprehensive individual-level 
and county-level driver’s license suspension data. Thanks to the North 
 10. JON A. CARNEGIE & ROBERT J. EGER, III, AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADM’RS, 
REASONS FOR DRIVER LICENSE SUSPENSION,RECIDIVISM, AND CRASH INVOLVEMENT AMONG 
DRIVERS WITH SUSPENDED/REVOKED LICENSES i, v–vi (2009), https://www.nhtsa.gov/ 
sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/811092_driver-license.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5AK-9L7Y]. 
 11. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-201(6)(b) (2019) (ending the practice of driver’s 
license suspension for nonpayment of traffic fines); VT. STAT.ANN. tit. 4, § 1109(b) (2019) (same); 
see also infra Part IV. 
 12. See  MARIO SALAS & ANGELA CIOLFI, LEGAL AID JUSTICE CTR., DRIVEN BY 
DOLLARS: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS OF DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSION LAWS FOR 
FAILURE TO PAY COURT DEBT 7–9 (2017), https://www.justice4all.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/Driven-by-Dollars.pdf [https://perma.cc/TK5K-J3YN] (“Of the 44 
jurisdictions that suspend driver’s licenses for unpaid criminal or traffic court debt, 39 do so 
indefinitely.”); see also Meghan Keneally, ‘It’s Not America’: 11 Million Go Without a License 
Because of Unpaid Fines, ABC NEWS (Oct. 25, 2019, 3:11 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/ 
vicious-cycle-11-million-live-drivers-license-unpaid/story?id=66504966 [https://perma.cc/9TLT-
S8QF] (summarizing a study by the Fines and Fees Justice Center reporting a decrease in the 
number of states that suspend licenses over unpaid fees and fines); Joint Statement on Texas 
Repeal of the Driver Responsibility Program, FINES & FEES JUST. CTR. (Sept. 9, 2019), 
https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/2019/09/09/joint-statement-on-texas-repeal-of-the-driver-
responsibility-program [https://perma.cc/G439-64YS] (noting that as of Fall 2019, six states— 
California, Idaho, Mississippi, Montana, Texas, and Virginia—and Washington, D.C., have 
abolished driver’s license suspensions for non-driving-related reasons). 
 13. Keneally, supra note 12 (interviewing Nusrat Choudhury, the deputy director of the 
ACLU’s Racial Justice Program, who makes this argument). 
 14. Id.; see also infra Part II.B. 
 15. See infra Part II.B (summarizing prior research regarding driver’s license suspensions in 
Wisconsin, California, New Jersey, and New York). 
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Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts (“AOC”), we were able 
to acquire all active driver’s license suspensions for failures to appear 
in court and failures to pay fines and fees. We provide a descriptive 
analysis of the demographics and characteristics of the state’s 
population of all drivers suspended for non-driving-related reasons, 
including for failure to appear and failure to pay fines and fees. Then 
we conduct a series of mixed-level modeling regression analysis for the 
2010 to 2017 time period, including two additional datasets: North 
Carolina traffic-stop data and county-level traffic court docket data, 
also from the AOC. These analyses allow us to quantify the role of race 
and poverty in predicting the number of suspensions at a county level 
and rule out other plausible explanations for disparate suspension
rates, such as disparate traffic-stop rates or traffic court cases. Our 
analyses are available on the Open Science Framework (“OSF”).16 
These findings have constitutional implications. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that there is a constitutionally 
protected liberty and property interest in a driver’s license that cannot 
be revoked or suspended “without that procedural due process 
required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”17 That said, the Court has 
approved postsuspension hearing processes, at least for short-term 
suspensions,18 and lower courts have been divided in recent 
constitutional challenges to driver’s license suspension schemes.19 
What makes these findings particularly relevant, however, is not just 
 16. See William Crozier & Brandon Garrett, North Carolina Drivers License Suspensions,
OPEN SCI. FRAMEWORK (Dec. 2, 2019, 7:28 AM), https://osf.io/fwxja [https://perma.cc/LZ4M-
DU83] (providing aggregate data, data-cleaning method, code, and preregistration). This site also 
contains information on the source of the data, the preregistration of analyses, and the general 
project. 
17. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971). 
18. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10–12 (1979) (approving a state’s procedure for ninety-
day driver’s license suspensions, which made available only postsuspension hearings to challenge 
the suspension). 
19. Recent constitutional litigation has challenged driver’s license suspension statutes largely 
on due process grounds. See, e.g., Stinnie v. Holcomb, 396 F. Supp. 3d 653, 656–57 (W.D. Va. 
2019); Thomas v. Haslam, 329 F. Supp. 3d 475, 479–80 (M.D. Tenn. 2018), vacated as moot sub 
nom. Thomas v. Lee, 776 F. App’x 910 (6th Cir. 2019); Mendoza v. Garrett, 358 F. Supp. 3d 1145, 
1150 (D. Or. 2018); Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 3d 758, 778–80 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2016); see also Press Release, ACLU of N. Cal., Landmark Lawsuit Settled, Paves Way for 
Fair Treatment of Low-Income California Drivers (Aug. 8, 2017) [hereinafter ACLU Press 
Release], https://www.aclunc.org/news/landmark-lawsuit-settled-paves-way-fair-treatment-low-
income-california-drivers [https://perma.cc/J4FH-Y26B]. The North Carolina driver’s license 
suspension statute is presently the subject of federal litigation. See Johnson v. Jessup, 381 F. Supp. 
3d 619, 623–24 (M.D.N.C. 2019) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection claims), 
appeal filed, No. 19-1421 (4th Cir. Apr. 19, 2019). 
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the scale of the driver’s license suspensions, but that they are 
disparately imposed on minorities and poorer communities. These 
findings have implications for equal protection and due process 
challenges in which disparate enforcement of unfair procedures 
magnifies the constitutional harm.20 Indeed, some courts that have 
granted relief in constitutional challenges to driver’s license 
suspensions have focused on an “equal process” theory in which both 
the equal protection and due process analyses play a role.21 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins by describing the 
constitutional and statutory background concerning driver’s license 
suspension. It then describes the North Carolina driver’s license 
suspension statute and the procedures involved in suspending licenses 
for failure to appear in court and failure to pay traffic fines. Part II 
reviews the literature concerning fines and fees, misdemeanor criminal 
justice, and driver’s license suspensions in particular. Part III turns to 
the empirical analysis of data concerning the 1.25 million driver’s 
license suspensions in North Carolina. Part IV concludes by exploring 
the political and constitutional implications of these findings. It 
emphasizes that important questions remain for future research that 
could inform constitutional litigation, local restoration efforts, 
dismissals of charges, and legislative efforts to restore licenses and end 
the suspension of driver’s licenses for non-driving-related traffic 
offenses. These findings relate to larger efforts to document and 
address the overuse of fines, fees, and bail in our criminal and civil 
court systems.22 Large-scale and holistic efforts are needed to undo the 
effects of such systemic deprivations of rights. 
I. THE LAW OF DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSION
This Part begins by providing an overview of federal constitutional 
decisions regarding the suspension of driver’s licenses, focusing on 
both due process and equal protection claims. Second, this Part 
provides an overview of the growth of driver’s license suspension 
statutes nationally and how federal regulation incentivized that 
20. For a discussion of the equal protection, due process, and cumulative “equal process” 
claims in such legal challenges, see generally Brandon L. Garrett, Wealth, Equal Protection, and 
Due Process, 61 WM. &MARY L. REV. 397 (2020). 
 21. Id. at 25–26. 
 22. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, FINES, FEES, AND BAIL: PAYMENTS IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM THAT DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT THE POOR 2–3 (2015), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/1215_cea_fine_fee_bail_issue 
_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q238-RDP4]. 
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2020] DRIVEN TO FAILURE 1591 
practice. Third, this Part describes the North Carolina statutes related 
to driver’s license suspension and how they operate in the state.
A. Constitutional Decisions on Driver’s License Suspensions 
By the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court had addressed the practice 
of driver’s license suspension as part of its development of procedural 
due process rights in the context of the administrative state. The Court 
has interpreted the Due Process Clause to require the state to provide 
notice and an opportunity to be heard before it deprives an individual 
of a protected liberty or property interest.23 An individual holds both a 
liberty and property interest in their driver’s license because it affects 
their livelihood and ability to travel.24 As the Court has put it, “driving 
an automobile [is] a virtual necessity for most Americans.”25 Therefore, 
as the Supreme Court held in Bell v. Burson,26 a driver’s license is 
protected and subject to procedural due process requirements.27 When 
the state suspends a person’s driver’s license, doing so does not always 
require actual notice or personal service, but rather notice that is 
“reasonably calculated” to reach affected parties.28 Thus, procedural 
due process requires that the state provide an individual notice of a 
deprivation and an opportunity to be heard in order to guard against 
erroneous deprivation.29 Such notice must be made “at a meaningful 
time and in a meaningful manner.”30 In conducting this inquiry, courts 
may consider the individual and state interests at issue, as well as the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation.31 
23. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 348 (1976). 
 24. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10 (1979) (recognizing that the suspension of a 
driver’s license “implicates a protectible property interest”); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 
(1971) (“Once [driver’s] licenses are issued . . . their continued possession may become essential 
in the pursuit of a livelihood.”). State courts had recognized this earlier as well. See, e.g., Hecht v. 
Monaghan, 121 N.E.2d 421, 423–24 (N.Y. 1954). 
25. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977). 
26. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). 
 27. Id. at 539. 
 28. See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
 29. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976). 
 30. Id. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 
 31. Id. at 348. Due process first requires a determination of whether a protected interest is 
implicated, then an inquiry into what process is due: 
[A] weighing process has long been a part of any determination of the form of hearing 
required in particular situations by procedural due process. But, to determine whether 
due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the ‘weight’ but 
to the nature of the interest at stake. 
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More recently, it has been the lower federal courts that have 
addressed suspensions for non-driving-related reasons, such as 
nonpayment of traffic tickets or failure to appear in court.32 Some of 
those courts have addressed equal protection and due process claims 
jointly,33 following the reasoning of the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Bearden v. Georgia.34 In that case, the Court held that courts cannot 
revoke probation for failure to pay a fine or victim restitution without 
finding that alternatives would not satisfy the state’s interest in 
ensuring payment.35 In this type of analysis, “[d]ue process and equal 
protection principles converge.”36 The dual concern with inequality 
where criminal outcomes affect those who cannot afford to pay and 
with unfair process that does not adequately consider ability to pay 
results in a constitutional violation.37 Thus, the Court has emphasized 
in this line of cases that a state may not subject an indigent person, 
“who, by definition, is without funds,” to a harsher punishment “solely 
because [they are] unable to pay [a] fine.”38 Thus, both procedural due 
process and equal protection concerns may play a role in constitutional 
analysis of driver’s license suspension practices. 
B. Federal Legislation and Driver’s License Suspensions 
The nationwide practice of suspending driver’s licenses for non-
driving-related reasons is rooted in the shifts in federal policy toward 
drug enforcement and child-support collection, which began in the late 
1980s.39 As part of a tough-on-drugs policy, Congress—in the Drug 
Offender’s Driving Privileges Suspension Act—amended the Highway 
Apportionment Act to allow withholding of federal highway funds 
Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570–71 (1972) (footnote omitted); see also
State v. Shawn P., 859 P.2d 1220, 1230–31 (Wash. 1993) (Madsen, J., dissenting) (addressing 
whether driver’s licenses can be suspended for reasons not having to do with safety and driving). 
 32. See, e.g., Fowler v. Benson, 924 F.3d 247, 252 (6th Cir. 2019); Johnson v. Jessup, 381 F. 
Supp. 3d 619, 624–25 (M.D.N.C. 2019), appeal filed, No. 19-1421 (4th Cir. Apr. 19, 2019); Stinnie 
v. Holcomb, 396 F. Supp. 3d 653, 657–58 (W.D. Va. 2019). 
 33. Garrett, supra note 20, at 25–26. 
34. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983). 
 35. Id. at 672–73. 
 36. Id. at 665. 
 37. Id. at 667–69, 672–73. 
38. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242 (1970). 
 39. Barbara Corkrey, Restoring Drivers’ Licenses Removes a Common Legal Barrier to 
Employment, 37 J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 523, 523 (2004). 
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from any state that failed to suspend the licenses of drug offenders.40 
Additionally, the 1988 Family Support Act created federal child-
support guidelines,41 which incentivized states to suspend licenses for 
nonpayment of child support or risk losing federal funds. The Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
officially made it a requirement for states to have procedures in place 
authorizing such suspensions.42 This federal legislation encouraged 
states to create administrative procedures to suspend such licenses to 
avoid burdening the court systems.43 A subsequent General 
Accountability Office study found that the child-support-related 
legislation may not have been effective in motivating noncustodial 
parents to pay past-due child-support obligations.44 Regardless, those 
federal requirements played an important role in promoting the 
40. The Act was an amendment to a Department of Transportation appropriations act. 
Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-516, § 333, 
104 Stat. 2155, 2184–86 (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. § 159(a)(3)(2018)). The Act withholds 
federal funds from states unless they meet certain requirements: 
[T]he State has enacted and is enforcing a law that requires in all circumstances, or 
requires in the absence of compelling circumstances warranting an exception—(i) the 
revocation, or suspension for at least 6 months, of the driver’s license of any individual 
who is convicted, after the enactment of such law, of—(I) any violation of the 
Controlled Substances Act, or (II) any drug offense . . . . 
Id. For more on the political environment in which the Act was enacted, see generally Aaron J. 
Marcus, Are the Roads a Safer Place Because Drug Offenders Aren’t on Them?: An Analysis of 
Punishing Drug Offenders with License Suspensions, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 557 (2004).
41. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 667 (2018)). 
42. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-193, § 369, 110 Stat. 2105, 2251 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(16)). The law 
provides: 
[E]ach State must have in effect laws requiring the use of . . . [p]rocedures under which 
the State has (and uses in appropriate cases) authority to withhold or suspend, or to 
restrict the use of driver’s licenses, professional and occupational licenses, and 
recreational and sporting licenses of individuals owing overdue support or failing, after 
receiving appropriate notice, to comply with subpoenas or warrants relating to 
paternity or child support proceedings. 
42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(16).
 43. RYAN T. SCHWIER & AUTUMN JAMES, IND. UNIV. ROBERT H. MCKINNEY SCH. OF 
LAW, ROADBLOCK TO ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE: HOW DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSION 
POLICIES IN INDIANA IMPEDE SELF-SUFFICIENCY, BURDEN STATE GOVERNMENT & TAX 
PUBLIC RESOURCES 22 (2016) (“To avoid burdening state court systems, the [Family Support] 
Act encouraged the use of administrative procedures. As a result, license suspension programs 
became a popular tool for many states.”). 
 44. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-02-239, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT:
MOST STATES COLLECT DRIVERS’ SSNS AND USE THEM TO ENFORCE CHILD SUPPORT 23 
(2002), http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/233361.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Q4V-7DQ6]. 
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development of state-level automated systems for suspending driver’s 
licenses. 
C. Driver’s License Suspension in North Carolina 
Today in North Carolina, as in other states, a driver’s license can 
be suspended or permanently revoked for a wide range of reasons, 
including speeding, reckless driving, and driving while impaired 
(“DWI”) or refusing to take a blood or breath test. Licenses may also 
be suspended as part of a criminal court sentence or via a decision of 
another state agency, such as for the failure to pay child support.45 If 
that other court or agency agrees that the suspension should be 
discontinued, then one must still pay a fee for the restoration of the 
driver’s license—a sixty-five dollar restoration fee and a fifty-dollar 
service fee—to the Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) and apply 
for a new driver’s license.46 In cases in which a person was charged with 
a motor-vehicle offense, there are two reasons why driver’s licenses 
may be indefinitely suspended in North Carolina: failure to appear 
(“FTA”) for a court date and failure to comply (“FTC”) with a fine, 
penalty, or court costs. One can also be suspended for both reasons. 
The first reason is a failure to appear in court upon receipt of a 
notice for a hearing or trial for a motor-vehicle offense.47 Traffic cases 
in North Carolina are heard by district courts, which handle 
misdemeanors, although larger districts create separate and dedicated 
traffic courts.48 If a person does not appear on the date scheduled, then 
the case is marked as “called and failed.”49 After twenty days, the court 
issues a “Failure to Appear,” which results in an additional FTA fee.50 
After twenty additional days pass, the court notifies the DMV of the 
FTA through the Automated Criminal and Infraction System 
 45. Suspended License in North Carolina, DMV.ORG, https://www.dmv.org/nc-north-
carolina/suspended-license.php [https://perma.cc/H39Q-26F8]; see also N.C.GEN. STAT. § 20-16.5 
(2019) (establishing civil license revocation); id. § 20-17.8(g) (suspension for violation of the 
ignition-interlock restriction).
 46. Suspended License in North Carolina, supra note 45. 
 47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-24.1(a)(1) (listing “failed to appear, after being notified to do so, 
when the case was called for a trial or hearing” as the first reason for a mandatory license 
revocation). 
 48. Traffic Violations, N.C. JUD. BRANCH, https://www.nccourts.gov/help-topics/traffic-and-
vehicles/traffic-violations [https://perma.cc/CTR3-H96W]. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id.
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(“ACIS”) and a driver’s license is suspended.51 The DMV then sends a 
notice of revocation.52 
The second reason for an indefinite suspension in North Carolina 
is for failure to pay a fine, penalty, or court costs ordered in a motor-
vehicle offense,53 which this Article refers to as failures to comply or 
“FTC” cases. The fines include the underlying fines imposed for the 
traffic offense itself.54 Additional costs may include a fee for an FTA, 
which is $200.55 As a result, FTAs may lead to FTCs. 
An indefinite driver’s license suspension remains in place in North 
Carolina until the person “disposes of the charge,” if there was an FTA, 
or shows that they were not the person charged with the offense.56 For 
an FTC, the person may cure the revocation by paying the amount or 
by demonstrating that the failure “was not willful” and that the person 
“is making a good faith effort to pay” or that the amount “should be 
remitted.”57 It is worth noting that no showing of willful failure to pay 
is required before a court revokes a driver’s license for failure to 
comply.58 If one of those conditions for restoration is met before the 
effective date of the revocation order, the license is restored; however, 
if that date has expired, then the person must pay the restoration fee 
and satisfy DMV requirements to receive a new license, as noted.59 In 
addition, judges may supply limited driving privileges so a person can 
drive to work or receive emergency medical care while a revocation 
remains in place.60 
 51. Id.; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-24.2(a)(1) (requiring courts to report FTAs to the DMV); 
see also  WAYNE SMOAK, N.C. JUDICIAL DEP’T, OVERVIEW OF ACIS 6, 16–17 (2004), 
https://connect.ncdot.gov/groups/NCTRCC/Documents/Administrative%20Office%20of%20C 
ourts.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2UM-4H6G]. 
 52. Traffic Violations, supra note 48. 
 53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-24.1(a)(2) (listing “failed to pay a fine, penalty, or court costs 
ordered by the court” as the second reason for a mandatory license revocation). 
 54. N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, TRAFFIC OFFENSES FOR WHICH COURT 
APPEARANCE MAY BE WAIVED 1–2 (2017), https://www.nccourts.gov/assets/documents/ 
publications/traffic.1.7.pdf [https://perma.cc/7C9E-ZPJT]. 
 55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-304(a)(6). 
 56. Id. § 20-24.1(b)(1)–(2).
 57. Id. § 20-24.1(b)(3)–(4).
 58. Id. § 20-24.1(a)(2) (mandating revocation for any FTC). 
 59. Id. § 20-24.1(c). 
60. The driving privilege is limited to certain enumerated circumstances: 
A limited driving privilege is a judgment issued in the discretion of a court for good 
cause shown authorizing a person with a revoked driver’s license to drive for essential 
purposes related to any of the following: 
(1) The person’s employment.
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Without such exceptions, however, it is an offense to drive while a 
license is revoked (“DWLR”), knowing that the license is revoked, and 
the charge results in an additional fine and up to twenty days in jail.61 
North Carolina has a similar misdemeanor offense if the revocation 
was for an impaired-driving offense.62 In 2013, the legislature also 
enacted additional DWLR offenses, creating a separate Class 1 
misdemeanor offense for driving with a license revoked for impaired 
driving.63 
North Carolina’s license suspension statute, adopted in 1985,64 
resembles those in many of the states in which unpaid court debt or 
nonappearance results in indefinite driver’s license suspension.65 
Importantly, the driver’s license must be suspended before the person 
has an opportunity to present information concerning ability to pay.66 
In North Carolina, as in most jurisdictions,67 court systems now 
electronically transmit records of nonpayment or nonappearance to 
the DMV.68 This system permits rapid and large-scale implementation 
of driver’s license suspensions. 
II. THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON DRIVER’S LICENSE 
SUSPENSION
This Part reviews the literature related to this Article’s research 
questions regarding how driver’s license suspensions are imposed in 
practice. First, it describes related research regarding the misdemeanor 
system in the United States and its impact, including on marginalized 
(2) The maintenance of the person’s household. 
(3) The person’s education.
(4) The person’s court-ordered treatment or assessment. 
(5) Community service ordered as a condition of the person’s probation.
(6) Emergency medical care. 
(7) Religious worship. 
Id. § 20-179.3(a).
 61. Id. § 20-28(a). 
 62. Id. § 20-28(a1). 
63. Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2013, § 18B.14.(f), 
2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 995, 1305–06 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-28(a1)(2019)). 
64. An Act To Classify Minor Traffic Offenses As Infractions and To Provide a Procedure 
for the Disposition of Such Infractions by the Courts, ch. 764, § 19, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 1111, 
1115 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-24.1 (2019)). 
 65. See SALAS & CIOLFI, supra note 12, at 8. 
 66. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-24.1(a)–(b). 
 67. SALAS & CIOLFI, supra note 12, at 7. 
 68. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 

	


	

			 	
  	
	
  
 
   
 
   
   
  
 
2020] DRIVEN TO FAILURE 1597 
groups. It provides an overview of the broader literature on fines and 
fees and describes the literature regarding traffic stops and racial 
profiling by police. Second, this Part describes the limited empirical 
research available concerning driver’s license suspensions, which are 
this Article’s focus. 
A. Misdemeanors, Fines and Fees, and Traffic Stops 
Driver’s license suspensions resulting from traffic cases are a 
subset of the criminal misdemeanor system’s collateral-consequences 
problem in the United States. Despite its expansive size, only recently 
have empirical attempts been made to quantify and understand the 
true breadth of misdemeanor cases in the United States. One such 
recent study estimates that there are 13.2 million misdemeanor cases 
filed each year and that such cases disproportionately affect poor 
people and people of color.69 On the front end, misdemeanor 
enforcement and prosecution can vary widely between jurisdictions, in 
part due to how police decide to exercise their discretion.70 On the back 
end, despite expectations that misdemeanors are less consequential 
than felonies, Professor Jenny Roberts concludes the system is in crisis 
because of insufficient resources, too many cases, and a lack of 
guidelines on how to prosecute and defend misdemeanor cases.71 This 
system results in high rates of guilty pleas—many of which may very 
well be false because of little to no development of evidence—and 
widespread consequences.72 However, studies of misdemeanor 
outcomes often exclude data from traffic cases—or at least non-DWI 
traffic cases—due to the size of traffic court dockets, inconsistency in 
reporting on traffic outcomes, and difficulty in obtaining data 
concerning traffic cases.73 
Researchers have documented the expansion of criminal fines, 
fees, and other costs imposed in states, including in North Carolina, in 
general and not just in traffic cases. These legal financial obligations 
69. Megan Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice, 98 B.U. L. REV. 
731, 731 (2018). 
 70. See Illya Lichtenberg, Police Discretion and Traffic Enforcement: A Government of 
Men?, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 425, 430 (2003) (noting that “only certain offenders [are] subjected 
to the quasi-criminal penalties of traffic enforcement at the discretion of the police”). 
 71. Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower 
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 277–78 (2011). 
 72. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1313 (2012). 
 73. See Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 69, at 773–75 (noting the exclusion of traffic 
violations and other traffic cases in annual reports of misdemeanor cases in various state courts). 
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(“LFOs”) encompass all of the different types of financial charges 
imposed in criminal cases. Researchers estimate over $50 billion in 
total LFOs have been imposed in the United States.74 In North 
Carolina, fees increased an average of 400 percent from 1997 to 2017.75 
Researchers have documented increases in recent years in such LFOs 
assessed, such that they often exceed penalties for underlying 
offenses.76 These LFOs can multiply over time, resulting in mounting 
court-related debt.77 Court debt can make it difficult for individuals to 
secure employment, housing, public assistance, and reinstatement of 
driver’s licenses.78 In North Carolina traffic cases, the underlying traffic 
fine may amount to less than $100, but subsequent fines for failure to 
appear in court and court costs may be many times more. There is a 
related concern that incentives exist for municipalities to use these 
LFOs as a revenue-generating mechanism that, as highlighted in the 
federal investigation into practices in Ferguson, Missouri,79 gets 
imposed disproportionately on the poor. 
Research on traffic enforcement has documented significant racial 
disparities in stops made by patrol officers as well as in poststop 
conduct, including in analysis across large numbers of jurisdictions.80 
Studies of North Carolina data—which is available due to statewide 
74. Neil L. Sobol, Fighting Fines & Fees: Borrowing from Consumer Law To Combat 
Criminal Justice Debt Abuses, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 841, 849 (2017). 
 75. HEATHER HUNT & GENE R. NICHOL, JR., N.C. POVERTY RESEARCH FUND, COURT 
FINES AND FEES: CRIMINALIZING POVERTY IN NORTH CAROLINA 4 (2017). 
 76. Sobol, supra note 74, at 863.
 77. See ALEXES  HARRIS ET AL., MONETARY SANCTIONS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 4 (2017), http://www.monetarysanctions.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Monetary-
Sanctions-Legal-Review-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/33UH-BX9Q] (describing mechanisms for 
how “[u]npaid legal financial obligations can trigger additional sanctions,” thus increasing the 
total debt owed (emphasis omitted)).
78. Rebecca Vallas & Roopal Patel, Sentenced to a Life of Criminal Debt: A Barrier to 
Reentry and Climbing out of Poverty, 46 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 131, 135 
(2012).
 79. See generally CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE 
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (2015) [hereinafter DOJ INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON 
POLICE DEPARTMENT], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/ 
attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/P359-GALH] 
(investigating and reporting on the practices of the Ferguson municipal government and 
municipal police departments, including the use of fees and fines in municipal courts as an 
important source of revenue on an annual basis).
 80. See generally EMMA PIERSON ET AL., A LARGE-SCALE ANALYSIS OF RACIAL 
DISPARITIES IN POLICE STOPS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES (2019), https://5harad.com/papers/ 
100M-stops.pdf [https://perma.cc/PT2E-P938] (analyzing one hundred million patrol stops and 
showing evidence of racial bias both in local police and highway patrol stops).
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legislation requiring collection of traffic-stop data, including 
demographic data81—have found evidence of such racial disparities, 
particularly regarding stop decisions by local police.82 A more recent 
study of North Carolina traffic-stop data found that police stopped 
black drivers for discretionary and minor infractions more often, but 
then let them go with no police action more often than white drivers.83 
Similarly, police conducted consent and probable-cause searches more 
often on black drivers, but they found contraband less often than 
during searches of white drivers.84 Such patterns suggest that while 
there may be persistent racial disparities in stops, there may not be for 
subsequent police action, such as traffic tickets.
B. Driver’s License Suspension Research 
The impact of driver’s license suspension deserves careful 
examination; it is a nearly national phenomenon, with forty-four states, 
as noted, suspending licenses for non-driving-related reasons. The 
impact of such suspensions is broad and includes economic and legal 
aspects. Such suspensions do not appear to provide an increase in 
public safety, as drivers suspended for non-driving-related reasons are 
much less likely to be involved in a crash than drivers suspended for 
driving-related reasons.85 Those with suspended licenses face a variety 
of impediments, such as limited employment prospects—both because 
they cannot transport themselves to work and because many employers 
in industries such as truck driving and food service require a driver’s 
license—as well as difficulty obtaining medical care and reduced ability 
to participate meaningfully in society, particularly in places in which 
 81. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-903 (2019). 
82. Patricia Warren et al., Driving While Black: Bias Processes and Racial Disparity in Police 
Stops, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 709, 729–31 (2006) (including behaviors such as frequency of highway 
travel, speeding, not wearing a seatbelt, changing lanes frequently, and frequently running yellow 
lights). 
83. Sharon LaFraniere & Andrew W. Lehren, The Disproportionate Risks of Driving While 
Black, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/us/racial-disparity-
traffic-stops-driving-black.html [https://perma.cc/5TT5-HS3W]. 
 84. Id.
 85. CARNEGIE & EGER, supra note 10, at vi; see also  MICHAEL A. GEBERS & DAVID J.
DEYOUNG, CAL. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, AN EXAMINATION OF THE CHARACTERISTICS 
AND TRAFFIC RISK OF DRIVERS SUSPENDED/REVOKED FOR DIFFERENT REASONS 24 (2002), 
http://dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/forms/about/profile/rd/r_d_report/section_4/s4-200.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W5JU-5YGU] (concluding that California drivers suspended for nondriving offenses “had the 
lowest crash risk of any of the suspended/revoked groups,” barely higher than those with valid 
driver’s licenses). 
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public transport is limited.86 One study found that 42 percent of 
respondents to a survey lost employment following a driver’s license 
suspension.87 Since driving is such an important means of 
transportation, there is evidence that most who have suspended 
licenses continue to drive. According to one study, 75 percent of those 
who have licenses suspended continue to drive.88 Those drivers are 
then more likely to be convicted of driving on a suspended or revoked 
license, which can lead to still more serious fines and criminal charges, 
including felony charges in some states.89 In three years in Texas, there 
were four hundred thousand prosecutions for driving with a suspended 
license.90 
It is not known how many people nationwide are affected by 
driver’s license suspensions. According to one estimate, based on data 
from the forty-two states and the District of Columbia that shared data, 
more than seven million people may have driver’s licenses suspended.91 
A handful of studies of driver’s license suspensions in recent years have 
uncovered the scale of such actions, but little empirical research—and 
none of it peer reviewed—has been done on this subject to better 
understand how these suspensions are imposed and their effects. 
 86. See JON A. CARNEGIE,ALAN M.VOORHEES TRANSP. CTR., RUTGERS, STATE UNIV. OF 
N.J., DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSIONS, IMPACTS AND FAIRNESS STUDY 17–20, 55–59, 63–64 
(2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE, IMPACTS AND FAIRNESS STUDY], 
https://www.nj.gov/transportation/business/research/reports/FHWA-NJ-2007-020-V1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E283-VNGP] (surveying literature indicating the economic and social effects of 
license suspensions, surveying New Jersey residents about adverse effects of suspension, and 
listing a variety of restricted-use license programs in other states that attempt to mitigate lack of 
employment, education, medical, and other problems exacerbated by having a suspended 
license). 
 87. Id. at 56. 
 88. Joseph Shapiro, How Driver’s License Suspensions Unfairly Target the Poor, NPR (Jan. 
5, 2015, 3:30 AM), https://www.npr.org/2015/01/05/372691918/how-drivers-license-suspensions-
unfairly-target-the-poor [https://perma.cc/8WLH-WCPJ]. 
 89. Driving While Revoked, Suspended or Otherwise Unlicensed: Penalties by State, NAT’L 
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/driving-
while-revoked-suspended-or-otherwise-unli.aspx [https://perma.cc/KW8U-NJ24] (surveying 
legislation in all fifty states, including several that impose felonies, such as Florida, Georgia, and 
Illinois). 
90. Andrea M. Marsh, Rethinking Driver’s License Suspensions for Nonpayment of Fines and 
Fees, in 2017 TRENDS IN STATE COURTS: FINES, FEES, AND BAIL PRACTICES: CHALLENGES AND 
OPPORTUNITIES 20, 23 (Deborah W. Smith, Charles F. Campbell & Blake P. Kavanagh eds., 
2017).
91. Justin Wm. Moyer, More Than 7 Million People May Have Lost Driver’s Licenses 
Because of Traffic Debt, WASH. POST (May 19, 2018, 4:18 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
local/public-safety/more-than-7-million-people-may-have-lost-drivers-licenses-because-of-traffic-
debt/2018/05/19/97678c08-5785-11e8-b656-a5f8c2a9295d_story.html [https://perma.cc/HM28-4NL7].
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Nationwide estimates have been affected by changing practices in some 
states. For example, California had been a major center of driver’s 
license suspensions, where four million adults—17 percent of the adult 
population—had a license suspension;92 however, in 2017, California 
enacted a statute ending the practice of suspending driver’s licenses.93 
Similarly, in Virginia, nearly one million drivers had suspensions94 prior 
to a recent legislative change.95 In Texas, it is 1.8 million people.96 
Beyond reports that provide information regarding aggregate numbers 
of suspended drivers in states in which data has been available, only a 
few state-level research efforts have described the number and 
demographics of those suspended. 
First, a 1998 report from Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and the 
surrounding area found a large number of suspensions—nearly seventy 
thousand adults—due to failure to pay traffic fines.97 These suspensions 
were disproportionately people in poverty, primarily centered in low-
income, urban areas of Milwaukee.98 The report also found that 
driver’s license suspensions were economically limiting, as many of the 
jobs and open jobs were in areas of the city that required easy 
transportation to access.99 More recently, Professors John Pawasarat 
and Louis M. Quinn found similar patterns in Milwaukee, such that 
“[i]n most situations, ‘driving while poor’ in Wisconsin . . . has more 
serious consequences than leaving the scene of an accident, passing a 
 92. ALEX BENDER ET AL., NOT JUST A FERGUSON PROBLEM: HOW TRAFFIC COURTS 
DRIVE INEQUALITY IN CALIFORNIA 9 (2015), https://www.lccr.com/wp-content/uploads/Not-
Just-a-Ferguson-Problem-How-Traffic-Courts-Drive-Inequality-in-California-4.8.15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A84L-5MX9]. 
 93. Associated Press, California No Longer Will Suspend Driver’s Licenses for Traffic Fines, 
L.A. TIMES (June 29, 2017, 9:50 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-driver-
license-fees-20170629-story.html [https://perma.cc/72GX-T7UG]. 
 94. SALAS & CIOLFI, supra note 12, at 1. 
 95. Caleb Stewart, Virginia Lawmakers Vote To Eliminate Driver’s License Suspensions over 
Fees, WHSV (Apr. 4, 2019, 1:24 PM), https://www.whsv.com/content/news/Governor-wants-to-
end-license-suspensions-for-unpaid-fees-503353961.html [https://perma.cc/QS55-EUF6]
(reporting on a state budget amendment that reinstated the suspended licenses of more than six 
hundred thousand Virginians). 
 96. SALAS & CIOLFI, supra note 12, at 1. 
 97. JOHN PAWASARAT & FRANK STETZER, EMP’T & TRAINING INST., REMOVING 
TRANSPORTATION BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT: ASSESSING DRIVER’S LICENSE AND VEHICLE 
OWNERSHIP PATTERNS OF LOW-INCOME POPULATIONS iii (1998), https://www4.uwm.edu/eti/ 
reprints/DOTbarriers.pdf [https://perma.cc/856G-YUYJ]. 
 98. Id. at iii–v, 7–10, 27. 
 99. Id. at v–vi. 
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school bus with flashing red lights, or driving more than 25 miles per 
hour above the legal limit.”100 
Second, a California report examined the number of suspensions 
and evidence of disparate impact in particular communities.101 The 
report concludes that the financial costs of the original ticket explode 
when a license is suspended, affecting individuals’ ability to get to work 
and maintain a job.102 In turn, the original fine becomes more difficult 
to pay off in addition to the other financial hardships associated with 
longer commutes or unemployment.103 Further, the authors concluded 
that formerly incarcerated individuals and their families and 
communities of color are particularly vulnerable to this cycle.104 
Additionally, such suspensions carry societal costs, including costs to 
public safety, because resources are diverted from real public safety 
concerns and provide a hurdle to postincarceration reentry; the court 
system, because of the administrative cost of the trials; state social 
services, because higher unemployment puts more strain on the 
agencies; and the DMV, because it has to track and restore 
suspensions.105 
Third, a New Jersey study examined data on suspensions, 
surveyed those who had driver’s licenses suspended, and found that 
although only about three hundred thousand New Jersey drivers were 
suspended at any time—only 5 percent of the population without much 
variation year to year—42 percent of those suspended drivers reported 
job loss, particularly those in urban and lower-income areas.106 
Fourth, an online report with analysis of New York state data 
regarding driver’s license suspensions in 2016, published by the 
 100. JOHN PAWASARAT & LOIS M. QUINN, EMP’T & TRAINING INST., ISSUES RELATED TO 
WISCONSIN “FAILURE TO PAY FORFEITURES” DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSIONS 2 (2014), 
http://dc.uwm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=eti_pubs [https://perma.cc/CGF5-
E8F4].
 101. BENDER ET AL., supra note 92, at 19. The California DMV did not track case-level 
information such as the race of people subject to suspensions. Id.
 102. Id. at 6–7. 
 103. Id. (describing how families choose between paying fines and meeting basic needs). 
 104. Id. at 19. 
 105. Id. at 20–21 (describing fines and suspensions as a “hidden tax” on public safety, the 
economy, and state government).
 106. CARNEGIE, IMPACTS AND FAIRNESS STUDY, supra note 86, at 1, 56. For this study’s 
survey design and findings, see generally JON A. CARNEGIE, ALAN M. VOORHEES 
TRANSPHTTPS://PERMA.CC/66Q3-5CCS. CTR., RUTGERS, STATE UNIV. OF N.J., DRIVER’S 
LICENSE SUSPENSIONS, IMPACTS AND FAIRNESS STUDY: VOLUME 2: TECHNICAL APPENDICES
(2007), http://vtc.rutgers.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/MVC-DL-Susp-Final-Report-Vol2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/66Q3-5CCS]. 
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nonprofit partnership Driven by Justice Coalition, describes and 
visually depicts approximately 680,000 suspensions for traffic debt in 
that year, including both FTC and FTA cases.107 The statistical analyses 
that they report mirror what we find in North Carolina, in which both 
race and poverty are associated with suspension rates.108 
To summarize, the existing data on driver’s license suspensions are 
from three states and one urban area. Those unpublished analyses 
suggest that license suspensions are fairly common, affecting hundreds 
of thousands of people per state, and that people of color and 
vulnerable communities are disproportionately affected. They are 
primarily descriptive in nature and do not allow for quantifying the 
effects of license suspensions. Here, we explore whether these findings 
hold in North Carolina by describing the state population of individuals 
with suspended licenses and using linear mixed-model regressions to 
quantitatively explore the relationship between poverty, race, and 
suspensions. 
III. EMPIRICALANALYSIS OF NORTH CAROLINA DRIVER’S LICENSE 
SUSPENSION DATA
This Part turns to an empirical analysis of data provided by the 
North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts, reflecting all cases 
in which there was an active driver’s license suspension in North 
Carolina for an FTC or FTA as of September 2018. In Section A, we 
describe the data sources and the design of our analyses. In Section B, 
we present descriptive data, including the demographics of those 
affected by these suspensions. In Section C, we describe these data over 
time. In Section D, we describe the geographic distribution of 
suspensions in North Carolina by county. 
Finally, in Section E, we present the results of a regression analysis 
aimed primarily at quantifying the relationship between race, poverty, 
and suspension rates in each county. Specifically, we rely on several 
models that used the number of people with an FTA suspension, an 
FTC suspension, or suspensions due to both an FTA and FTC per 
county per year between 2010 and 2017 as an outcome variable. We 
included as variables the number of white and black individuals above 
and below the poverty level in each county in each year. We also 
107. Joanna Weiss & Claudia Wilner, Opportunity Suspended: How New York’s Traffic Debt 
Suspension Laws Disproportionately Harm Low-Income Communities and Communities of 
Color, DRIVEN BY JUST. COAL., https://www.drivenbyjustice.org [https://perma.cc/Y79K-X8XF]. 
 108. See id.
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brought in data concerning the number of traffic stops and the number 
of traffic cases in each county in each year to assess whether traffic 
stops and the size of the traffic docket account for variation in the 
downstream driver’s license suspensions.
A. Data and Design 
The data file analyzed here, provided by the North Carolina AOC, 
reflects all cases, as of September 2018, in which court records reflect 
that a driver’s license suspension was reported to the North Carolina 
DMV and the suspension is currently in place. These data come from 
ACIS.109 The time period extends back to the 1980s110—which we 
report in the subsequent descriptive sections—but we only include data 
from 2010–2017 in regression models. In 2011, the AOC adopted a new 
data system,111 and coverage during the period from 2011 to the present 
may be better. In addition, the further back the cases extend, the more 
likely it is that the person affected may be deceased or may have moved 
out of state. 
The suspension cases analyzed reflect individuals with FTCs and 
FTAs, and sometimes both, as the reason for the suspension. These 
cases represent individuals who have active suspensions for at least one 
FTA and/or FTC charge but exclude suspensions that result from a 
criminal sentence, such as a DWI. Importantly, these data do not 
reflect cases in which a license was restored because the person paid 
the fine or appeared in court and paid FTA-related fines. For each 
individual, we attribute the suspension to the county in which the 
license was suspended, not necessarily the county of residence. Some 
individuals had multiple FTAs and/or FTCs, sometimes for the same 
event, and sometimes for multiple events across several years. To 
account for these individuals, we used the earliest active suspension
and excluded subsequent suspensions from analysis; to accomplish this, 
we excluded repeat individual names. As a result, we excluded 
different individuals with the same name—a conservative strategy that 
 109. See generally  TECH. SERVS. DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, AUTOMATED 
CRIMINAL/INFRACTIONS SYSTEM (ACIS) CRIMINAL INQUIRY MODULE USER MANUAL (2010) 
[hereinafter ACIS USER MANUAL], https://www.nccourts.gov/assets/documents/publications/ 
Criminal-Inquiry-Manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/55HA-VVSN] (describing how to use the ACIS 
criminal module). 
 110. ACIS USER MANUAL, supra note 109, at PF1-ICA Inquiry 10. 
111. EBI Screening Expert, North Carolina Changes Retrieval Access to Criminal Records, 
EBI (Mar. 11, 2011), https://www.ebiinc.com/bid/55328/north-carolina-changes-retrieval-access-
to-criminal-records [https://perma.cc/Y8N7-G6HP]. 
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was preferable to problems introduced by other strategies, such as 
pairing names with birthdates but birthdates were often inconsistent 
across individuals. The county-level data and code for data cleaning 
and analyses are available on the OSF.112 
In addition to a descriptive analysis, we also performed a series of 
mixed-model linear regressions (“MLM”) to understand the 
relationship between race, poverty, and driver’s license suspensions. 
These allowed us to control for random variation between years and 
counties and with better precision estimate the relationship between 
the predictor variables we care about and outcome variables on North 
Carolina driver’s license suspensions from 2010–2017. We used this 
time period, rather than the entire dataset, because 2010 was the 
earliest year for which we had values for all variables. By analyzing at 
the county-year level, we have eight hundred total observations—eight 
years of data for each of North Carolina’s one hundred counties. We 
also include data on the number of traffic stops and traffic court cases 
in each county to test the hypothesis that more traffic stops result in 
more traffic cases, which result in more suspensions, independent of 
race and poverty factors. We performed identical sets of regression 
analyses for three outcome variables: the number of unique people 
with currently active suspensions, per county, due to (1) an FTC; (2) an 
FTA; and (3) both FTC and FTA, for each year from 2010–2017.  
We used random-effects linear-regression analyses to assess the 
relationship between suspensions and the aforementioned predictors. 
We decided on this approach because of the nature of our data: 
specifically, one hundred counties, with data from eight years, in which 
traffic stops and traffic cases are missing from some years and some 
counties. Mixed-model linear-regression analyses allow us to model 
variation in data that is not independent from other predictors— 
specifically, county and year. Additionally, we can control for between-
county variation in suspension rates that may be the result of varying 
factors unique to each county. With this approach, we can estimate the 
amount of variation in suspensions that may be due to “random 
factors,” such as factors that differ from county to county and year to 
year. For example, variation in gas prices between years, ruralness, and 
different road conditions between counties may affect driving 
behavior, which may in turn affect traffic stops, cases, and suspensions. 
Additionally, variation between years and counties on suspension 
policies, enforcement, and restoration would affect county-level 
 112. See Crozier & Garrett, supra note 16. 
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variation in suspensions as well. MLMs control for such variation, 
giving us a clearer picture of how the predictors in each model relate 
to the number of active suspensions. Of course, MLM does not 
completely control for all potential endogenous variables—or 
important variables we may not measure—but it does allow us to 
capture a more accurate picture than we would see with fixed-effect 
modeling alone. 
B. Demographics and Driver’s License Suspension 
Consistent with findings from other states, driver’s license 
suspensions are frequent in North Carolina. We find that there are 
1,225,000 individuals with active driver’s license suspensions in North 
Carolina—827,000 for FTAs, 263,000 for FTCs, and 135,000 for both. 
This constitutes about one in seven, or 15 percent, of all adult drivers— 
who total about 8.25 million people—in North Carolina. These driver’s 
license suspensions are heavily disproportionate in their imposition on 
black and Latinx drivers. As Table 1 reveals, of those with driver’s 
license suspensions, 33 percent of those with FTA suspensions are 
black and 24 percent are Latinx, while 36 percent are white. For FTC 
suspensions, 47 percent of drivers with such suspensions are black, 11 
percent are Latinx, and 37 percent are white. By comparison, the North 
Carolina driving population is 21 percent black, 8 percent Latinx, and 
65 percent white. 
Table 1: Racial Demographics of Suspended Drivers 
N %
 	
	
 
 
 
       
    
 
               
 
               
 
               
 
 
N % N % N % 
9,669 
FTA 295,690 35.8 269,627 32.6 200,546 24.3 9,059 1.1 2,228 0.2 49,379 6.0 826,539 67.5 
FTC 98,787 37.5 122,991 46.7 30,130 11.4 4,733 1.8 627 0.2 6,167 2.3 263,435 21.5 
Both 50,011 37.1 68,036 50.5 
Native 
White Black Latinx American Asian Other Total
N % N % 
7.2 4,702 3.5 196 0.1 2,152 1.6 134,766 11.0 
Total 444,488 36.3 460,654 37.6 240,345 19.6 18,494 1.5 3,051 0.0 57,698 4.7 1,224,730 100.0 
Additionally, Table 2 illustrates further information about 
suspended drivers. Specifically, males make up the majority of 
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suspended drivers, and the median age at which the offense occurred 
is about 28.67 years old. Further, many suspended drivers also have a 
DWLR charge. It is a Class 3 misdemeanor to drive with a suspended 
license,113 as well as a Class 1 misdemeanor if the license was suspended 
for driving while impaired.114 The presence of a DWLR charge reflects 
a person who had their license suspended, continued to drive, and was 
subsequently charged with another violation. 
North Carolina officers file a large volume of DWLR charges each 
year. Over the five years from 2013–2017, there were about 160,000 
charges a year.115 We observe the same racial disparities in DWLR 
convictions as one observes in driver’s license suspensions—not 
displayed in the table. For DWLR charges filed from 2013–2017, 39 
percent or 297,537 of the defendants were white, 54 percent or 412,282 
were black, and 7 percent or 55,182 were Latinx. 
Table 2: Gender, Age, and DWLR Charges of Suspended Drivers 
Median 
Female Unknown Median age at suspension DWLR 
Male (%) (%) (%) offense (SD) length (SD) (%) 
130,773
FTA 
(15.8) 
72,802
FTC 
(27.6) 
98,800
Both 
(73.3) 
302,375
Total 
(24.7) 
626,421 
(75.8) 
199,564 
(24.1) 
544 
(0.0) 
28.33 (10.99) 11.4 (8.76) 
189,891 
(72.1) 
73,402 
(27.9) 
142 
(0.0) 
29.79 (10.81) 5.82 (7.89) 
100,987 
(74.9) 
33,745 
(25.0) 
34 (0.0) 28.71 (9.78) 9.52 (8.20) 
917,299 
(74.9) 
306,711 
(25.0) 
720 (0.0) 28.67 (10.83) 10.1 (8.64) 
 	
	
 
 
 
 
       
       
       
  
 
    
  
 
 113. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-28(a) (2019). 
 114. Id. § 20-28(a1). 
115. Special thanks to Frank Baumgartner for his help in creating helpful spreadsheets 
displaying AOC data on DWLR charges for the five-year period from 2013–2017. In 2017, AOC 
reports 148,000 such charges. In 2016, there were 161,000 DWLR charges; in 2015, there were 
164,000 charges; in 2014 there were 160,000 charges; and in 2013 there were 162,000 charges. 
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Figure 1 displays the demographics of those who have, as of 2018, 
suspended driver’s licenses in North Carolina, as compared with the 
adult driving population of North Carolina. We note that this is not a 
direct comparison because some of those with current suspended 
licenses may be out of state drivers, people who are deceased, or 
people who no longer live in North Carolina. These suspensions were 
imposed over many years, as discussed below, and so would not 
necessarily reflect present-day state demographics. To summarize, 
people of color are disproportionately represented in relation to their 
percentage of North Carolina’s driving population. Additionally, FTA 
suspensions are particularly high for the Latinx population, suggesting 
that demographic may be failing to appear for reasons other than 
failing to pay fines and fees. 
Figure 1: Suspensions by Race Compared to North Carolina 
Driving Population 
C. Active Driver’s License Suspensions By Year 
We also counted the number of active suspensions from each year. 
As shown in Figure 2, many drivers have long-standing suspensions 
stretching back to the 1980s. Further, tens of thousands of people have 
suspensions that have been active for decades. Unfortunately, we do 
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2020] DRIVEN TO FAILURE 1609 
not have information—such as cured FTCs and FTAs—that would 
allow us to observe whether there is a trend toward greater or reduced 
imposition of driver’s license suspensions on a yearly basis. Further, 
because we have information only on active suspensions, we are unable 
to assess whether year-to-year variation is due to policy changes 
resulting in more or fewer suspensions or, rather, more opportunities 
for people to pay fines. We can report here only the numbers of still-
active suspensions. To be sure, over time, one can observe steadily 
increasing numbers of driver’s license suspensions. One would expect 
to see fewer old suspensions because, over time, people can make 
efforts to pay fees and costs or cure an FTA in order to restore their 
driving privileges. However, it is worth noting how many suspensions 
remain after several years, suggesting that a driver’s license suspension 
is not easily cured and can be a long-term burden. 
Figure 2: Currently Active Suspended Drivers per Year  
D. Geography and Driver’s License Suspension 
We next describe the geographic distribution of suspensions in 
North Carolina by county. In a detailed Appendix B we report data, 
including demographic information, for all one hundred North 
Carolina counties. Unsurprisingly, we find that there is a strong 
positive correlation between the driver-aged population (sixteen years 
or older) of a county and the number of active suspensions (r = 0.847, 
95% CI [.780, .894], p < 0.001). This trend is best reflected in the 
scatterplot below, in which we have labeled some of the larger counties 
in North Carolina and outliers. Essentially, the more drivers there are 
in a county, the more suspensions that county has, with a few notable 
exceptions. 
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Figure 3. Suspended Drivers by County Population
For example, Wake County has the second-highest driver-aged 
population and the most active suspensions. Mecklenburg County, 
however, has the highest driver-aged population but only the sixth-
highest number of suspensions. Tables 3 and 4 show the five highest 
and five lowest counties for number of suspensions and the five most 
and five least populous counties of driver-aged citizens and number of 
suspensions, respectively. Appendix A includes these values for all one 
hundred North Carolina counties, as well as the number of each type 
of case and a racial breakdown for suspensions. 
Table 3: Counties with Most and Fewest Actively Suspended  
Drivers
County Number of Suspensions
Wake 107,313 
Guilford 74,441 
Cumberland 62,406 
Forsyth 56,861 
Robeson 40,598 
Alleghany 1,478 
Clay 730 
Pamlico 709 
Hyde 685 
Graham 681 
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Table 4: Suspended Drivers in Counties with the Highest and 
Lowest Driving Population
Counties with highest / Suspensions relative 
County lowest 16yo+ population Suspensions to population
Mecklenburg 847,754 36,919 4.4%
Wake 842,324 107,313 10.7%
Guilford 422,903 74,441 17.6%
Forsyth 299,282 56,861 19.0%
Cumberland 259,106 62,406 24.1%
Camden 8,420 2,330 27.7%
Jones 8,032 2,225 27.7%
Graham 7,026 681 9.7%
Hyde 4,573 685 15.0%
Tyrrell 3,367 1496 44.4%
There is also much variation in the number of suspensions 
compared to the driver-aged population. Table 5 lists the five highest 
and five lowest counties for number of suspensions relative to their 
driver-aged population. It is worth noting these values do not specify 
the percentage of a given county that has suspended licenses because 
our data do not specify whether a suspended individual currently 
resides in that county. Thus, 44.4 percent of Tyrrell County residents 
do not necessarily have a suspended license. Instead, we offer these 
percentages as an estimate of how active each county is in suspending 
licenses for FTAs and/or FTCs. Even still, Tyrrell County’s 44.4 
percent represents a very high number of suspensions for what one 
might expect given its population size and, in turn, resources. 
 
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Table 5: Counties with the Highest and Lowest Percentage of  
Suspensions Relative to Population 
County Suspensions relative to population 
Tyrrell 44.4% 
Robeson 39.4% 
Vance 36.8% 
Duplin 36.4% 
Sampson 34.9% 
Transylvania 7.7% 
Lincoln 7.6% 
Pamlico 6.5% 
Mecklenburg 4.4% 
Watauga 3.6% 
 	
	
 
 
  
 
E. Regression Results 
We were primarily interested in the role of poverty and race in 
predicting suspensions. We analyzed an MLM (“Model 1”) that 
regressed the total number of people with a suspension in a county per 
year onto the number of white individuals above the poverty line per 
year, the number of white individuals below the poverty line per year, 
the number of black individuals above the poverty line per year, and 
the number of black individuals below the poverty line per year. We 
also included as predictors the number of traffic stops in a county per 
year and the number of traffic cases in a county per year to assess 
whether traffic stops and traffic cases might account for variation in 
suspensions by being “upstream” in the legal process. Full regression 
table outputs are available in Appendix A. 
First, we tested whether a county’s rate of traffic stops and traffic 
cases plus racial disparity could explain the number of suspensions in 
that county per year. Specifically, we used step-wise modeling to assess 
a possible causal relationship between traffic stops, traffic cases, and 
suspensions by comparing models that only include traffic stops as a 
predictor (“Model A”), a model that uses only traffic stops and cases 
(“Model B”), and the more complete Model 1. Each Model—A, then 
B, then 1—had more predictor variables than the last, and at each 
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2020] DRIVEN TO FAILURE 1613 
“step” we compared the model fit and relationship between each 
predictor to the previous model. For further analyses, we also created 
Model 2, which was a simplified version of Model 1, containing the 
race/poverty predictors but lacking the traffic-stops and traffic-cases 
predictors. Note that for each model we used, the population of a given 
county is included as a predictor in order to control for population size, 
and “year” and “county” are included as random effects. Table 6 
summarizes the factors in each model. 
Table 6: Linear Mixed-Effects Model Descriptions
Model Name Predictors Outcome Variable(s)
Traffic Stops, Population 
Traffic Stops, Traffic Cases, 
Population 
Traffic Stops, Traffic Cases, Whites 
Above Poverty, Whites Below 
Poverty, Blacks Above Poverty, 
Blacks Below Poverty, Population 
Whites Above Poverty, Whites 
Below Poverty, Blacks Above 
Poverty, Blacks Below Poverty, 
Population 
Model A 
Model B 
Model 1 
Model 2 
FTA Suspensions, FTC 
Suspensions, Both 
Suspensions 
FTA Suspensions, FTC 
Suspensions, Both 
Suspensions 
FTA Suspensions, FTC 
Suspensions, Both 
Suspensions 
FTA Suspensions, FTC 
Suspensions, Both 
Suspensions 
We predicted that if traffic stops and cases were responsible for 
driving the numbers of suspensions per county, then we would observe 
a significant positive coefficient for the number of traffic stops per 
county per year (tested in Model A). Then, in a model containing 
traffic stops and traffic cases (Model B), the coefficients for both 
predictors would be positive, and traffic cases would diminish the 
predictive power of traffic stops compared to Model A because not all 
traffic stops would result in cases, but every suspension would be the 
result of a case. Then, in a model with traffic stops, traffic cases, and 
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poverty and race predictors (Model 1), traffic stops and cases would be 
significant and race and poverty predictors would not.
In short, we did not observe support for this hypothesis. In the 
interest of brevity, we do not include the entire models or an in-depth 
discussion here; interested readers can find the output on OSF. 
Although traffic stops were a positive predictor of suspensions in a 
county in Model A, Model B yielded a negative coefficient for traffic 
cases. That is, as the number of traffic cases in a county go up, the 
number of predicted suspensions go down. This is a counterintuitive 
finding and contrary to our predictions.116 Further, in Model 1, traffic 
stops were not significant predictors of the number of suspensions 
while traffic cases were, a finding in line with previous work in North 
Carolina showing that while traffic stops are racially disparate, traffic 
citations are not.117 Thus, we do not have support that traffic stops or 
court cases are solely driving the number of suspensions in each county. 
Comparing Model A to Model B and to Model 1 did not yield the 
predicted trend in coefficients for traffic-stops and traffic-cases 
predictors. 
Next, we were interested in quantifying the relationship between 
race, poverty, and suspensions in each county. Both Model 1 and 
Model 2 included the race- and poverty-population predictors, but 
because Model 2 has a slightly higher marginal R2,118 and coefficients 
flip positive when traffic stops and cases are removed consistent with a 
suppression effect,119 we focus our interpretation on Model 2. For each 
116. This result weakly suggests counties that have more traffic cases may have better 
methods of avoiding or treating FTA and FTC suspensions—perhaps because of more court 
resources, greater court efficiency, or better access to defendant support services. This is, 
however, speculative and in need of empirical support.
117. Frank R. Baumgartner, Derek A. Epp, Kelsey Shoub & Bayard Love, Targeting Young 
Men of Color for Search and Arrest During Traffic Stops: Evidence from North Carolina, 2002– 
2013, 5 POL., GROUPS & IDENTITIES 107, 113 (2016). 
 118. The R2 statistic calculates the amount of variation explained by the variables in the 
model, with higher values corresponding to less unexplained variance, such as variables not 
included in the model. Thus, higher R2 values indicate a better model fit. In MLM, marginal R2 
refers to variance explained by the fixed effects only; conditional R2 refers to variance explained 
by both the fixed and random effects. 
 119. See David P. MacKinnon, Jennifer L. Krull & Chondra M. Lockwood, Equivalence of 
the Mediation, Confounding and Suppression Effect, 1 PREVENTION SCI. 173, 175 (2000) (“Within 
a mediation model, a suppression effect would be present when the direct and mediated effects 
of an independent variable on a dependent variable have opposite signs . . . .”); Joseph Tzelgov 
& Avishai Henik, Suppression Situations in Psychological Research: Definitions, Implications, and 
Applications, 109 PSYCHOL. BULL. 524, 525 (1991) (“[A] suppressor variable [is] one that 
increases the validity of another variable by its inclusion in a regression equation.”). 
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of the suspension types, we display results of a model that includes 
black individuals above the poverty line, black individuals below the 
poverty line, white individuals above the poverty line, and white 
individuals below the poverty line,120 and county population as a 
control variable. For this, we excluded both the traffic-stops predictor 
(because it is not a significant predictor) and the traffic-case predictor, 
and only included race–poverty combinations. Table 7 below illustrates 
the results for Model 2, described in Appendix A, which focuses on the 
race and poverty variables. 
Table 7: Linear Mixed-Effects Regression Results for Model 2
FTA FTC Both
White Below
0.336 
(0.0354) 
0.150a 
(0.0366) 
0.106a 
(0.0133) 
Black Below
0.049 
(0.0105) 
0.039* 
(0.0127) 
0.018 
(0.0041) 
White Above
0.207 
(0.0215) 
0.089 
(0.0199) 
0.056a 
(0.0080) 
Black Above
0.585 
(0.0318) 
0.187a 
(0.0296) 
0.080a 
(0.0116) 
Population
-0.131 
(0.0136) 
-0.055 
(0.0127) 
-0.028 
(0.0052) 
Marginal R2 / 
Conditional R2 
0.641 / 
0.998 
0.694 / 
0.963 
0.654 / 
0.992 
Note: Values are unstandardized regression coefficients with parenthetical standard 
errors. Coefficients that share a superscript within a column are not significantly different 
from each other at p = .05.  *p = .002. All other values are significant at p < .001 level.
120. We did not include Latinx in our regression modeling because of incongruity between 
census and AOC data. The census denotes Latinx as an ethnicity; AOC data records Latinx as a 
race, without the same White-Latinx and Nonwhite-Latinx categories the census uses. Further, 
blacks and whites represent over 90 percent of the North Carolina population.
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If poverty had nothing to do with suspensions and a person’s 
nonpayment of a traffic fine is instead due to a willful decision not to 
pay fees, race and poverty should have no bearing on the number of 
FTC suspensions in a county. This, however, is not what we see. Those 
above the poverty line increase the number of suspensions by a small 
amount relative to other predictors—0.09 suspensions per white 
person above the poverty line. White individuals below the poverty line 
provide a slightly larger increase to suspensions—adding one white 
person under the poverty line increases suspensions by 0.15. Thus, for 
the white population, we see evidence that the number of white 
individuals in poverty more strongly predicts FTC suspensions than 
white individuals above the poverty line. 
The results for black residents, however, paint a more complicated 
picture. For FTC cases, we see a reversal of the trend for white 
residents. Adding a black individual above the poverty line increases 
the number of FTC suspensions in a county by 0.18; adding a black 
individual below the poverty line increases suspensions by 0.03. 
Despite being above the poverty line, the unimpoverished black 
population may still be disproportionately affected by the financial 
hardship of paying a fine, particularly compared to the white 
population above the poverty line. Black individuals below the poverty 
line, conversely, may have such a small effect because that population 
is less likely to have a driver’s license, less likely to appear in traffic 
court cases because they may not own a car, or may have access to 
better legal services for indigent defendants. 
One explanation for this relationship is that race is correlated with 
a range of other social and economic disadvantages. For example, 
researchers have observed interactions between race and poverty for 
other outcomes, such as bankruptcy filings, in which poverty affects 
whether a white person files under Chapter 13 or Chapter 7, but black 
individuals both in and out of poverty tend to file under Chapter 13.121 
121. Paul Kiel & Hannah Fresques, Data Analysis: Bankruptcy and Race in America, 
PROPUBLICA (Sept. 27, 2017), https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/bankruptcy-data-
analysis#fn1 [https://perma.cc/HYU2-2SKH]. Whereas Chapter 7 wipes out debt but allows 
debtors to acquire filers’ assets, Chapter 13 allows filers to retain assets—such as a car or house— 
provided they make scheduled payments for several years. Paul Kiel & Hannah Fresques, How 
the Bankruptcy System Is Failing Black Americans, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 27, 2017) [hereinafter 
Kiel & Fresques, How the Bankruptcy System Is Failing], 
https://features.propublica.org/bankruptcy-inequality/bankruptcy-failing-black-americans-debt-
chapter-13 [https://perma.cc/FM4Y-D2RM]. For filers with few assets, Chapter 7 can provide 
much-needed permanent relief quickly. Id. Conversely, filers with few assets using Chapter 13 can 
often end up in the same situation after failing to keep up with payments. Id. Because people of 
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In a band of southern states, including North Carolina, consumers 
filing for bankruptcy predominantly use Chapter 13, which does not 
allow people to wipe out their debt and retain their limited resources; 
Chapter 13 filing rates are particularly high in majority-black zip 
codes.122 It is possible that a number of economic factors disparately 
associated with race could be influencing this trend as well, such as 
black individuals below the poverty line not being able to afford cars 
and thus driving less or not having drivers’ licenses in the first place. It 
is also possible that the majority of black individuals not in poverty are 
not provided the same economic buffer as white individuals above the 
poverty line. That is, the black population above the poverty line likely 
does not have the same wealth as the white population above the 
poverty line, and may thus be hit harder by the financial hardship of 
needing to pay a fine. 
Indeed, work on the racial income gap has found that poverty 
looks different for black and white families, and the gap is not merely 
a result of present income. For example, whereas a white family just 
above the poverty line may have around $18,000 in wealth, a similarly 
situated black family has closer to zero dollars in wealth, or even 
negative wealth.123 The analysis of 2016 driver’s license suspensions in 
New York by the Fines and Fees Justice Center found the same 
pattern, in which poverty was connected with suspensions for white but 
not black populations.124 Further research should examine what may 
be driving these effects. 
Analysis of FTA suspensions show the same trend as FTC 
suspensions. White individuals below the poverty line (0.34) and black 
individuals above the poverty line (0.58) are most strongly associated 
with more FTA suspensions. Black individuals below the poverty line, 
although a significant predictor, are only weakly related to higher FTA 
suspensions (0.05). These results suggest that the same race- and 
poverty-related factors drive the population of people who have 
driver’s license suspensions for FTAs in traffic court as for failure to 
pay traffic fines and fees—namely, that people may not be appearing 
color often have fewer assets, Chapter 13 may not be the best option for them, but many end up 
filing Chapter 13 on their attorney’s advice. Id.
122. Kiel & Fresques, How the Bankruptcy System Is Failing, supra note 121. 
 123. WILLIAM DARITY JR. ET AL., SAMUEL DUBOIS COOK CTR. ON SOC. EQUITY & INSIGHT 
CTR. FOR CMTY. ECON. DEV., WHAT WE GET WRONG ABOUT CLOSING THE RACIAL WEALTH 
GAP 2 (2018), https://insightcced.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Where-We-Went-Wrong-
COMPLETE-REPORT-July-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PNJ-FRJ4]. 
124. Weiss & Wilner, supra note 107. 
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in court because of the financial cost. However, the predictive value of 
each race–poverty combination is greater than its FTC counterpart, 
suggesting that this may be where much of the suspension “action” is. 
This could be due to more individuals being unaware their licenses are 
being suspended for an FTA than an FTC. It may also be that 
individuals who know they cannot afford court costs decide not to 
appear in court, thereby incurring an FTA instead of an FTC.  
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL, POLICY, AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
THESE FINDINGS
As described in Part III, driver’s license suspensions are extremely 
widespread in North Carolina, affecting one in seven adult drivers and 
particularly associated at the county level with both whites below the 
poverty line and blacks above the poverty line. This next Part turns to 
the implications of these findings for policy, practice, and constitutional 
litigation. Although there are real constitutional and policy concerns 
with the practice in North Carolina, there are no easy answers to the 
policy problem posed by such suspensions, particularly given the vast 
scale of the practice. 
A. Implications for Policy and Practice
Drivers have a protected liberty and property interest in their 
licenses, which if issued by the state, cannot be revoked or suspended 
“without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”125 The patterns described raise constitutional questions 
concerning both the degree of procedural due process provided before 
taking the step of suspending a driver’s license as well as inequality in 
outcomes, given the demographic data presented. Recent litigation 
challenging driver’s license suspensions for fines-and-fees-related 
reasons includes cases in California,126 Michigan,127 Mississippi,128 
125. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971). 
126. Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief, Hernandez v. Cal. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, No. RG16836460 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 25, 
2016), http://ebclc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Hernandez-et-al-v.-CA-DMV-Complaint.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N5EN-AFTS]; ACLU Press Release, supra note 19. 
127. Fowler v. Benson, 924 F.3d 247 (6th Cir. 2019) (reversing and remanding a district court’s 
grant of a preliminary injunction enjoining Michigan from enforcing its driver’s license suspension 
scheme). 
128. Press Release, S. Poverty Law Ctr., SPLC Reaches Agreement with Mississippi To 
Reinstate over 100,000 Driver’s Licenses Suspended for Non-Payment of Fines (Dec. 19, 2017), 
https://www.splcenter.org/news/2017/12/19/splc-reaches-agreement-mississippi [https://perma.cc/ 
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Montana,129 Tennessee,130 Virginia,131 and Washington.132 The 
Tennessee case recently resulted in a finding that, absent an 
opportunity to demonstrate indigence, the state practice violated the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.133 The ruling has been 
vacated as moot due to enactment of new legislation in Tennessee, 
providing a procedure to inquire into ability to pay.134 The district judge 
had called the practice “powerfully counterproductive.”135 The judge 
explained: 
If a person has no resources to pay a debt, he cannot be threatened or 
cajoled into paying it; he may, however, become able to pay it in the 
future. But taking his driver’s license away sabotages that prospect. 
For one thing, the lack of a driver’s license substantially limits one’s 
ability to obtain and maintain employment. Even aside from the 
effect on employment, however, the inability to drive introduces new 
obstacles, risks, and costs to a wide array of life activities, as the 
former driver is forced into a daily ordeal of logistical triage to 
compensate for his inadequate transportation. In short, losing one’s 
driver’s license simultaneously makes the burdens of life more 
expensive and renders the prospect of amassing the resources needed 
to overcome those burdens more remote.136 
The judge noted that where many drivers with a suspended license
continue to drive, they may face further prosecution and further fines 
YR6E-XGEP].
129. Class Action Complaint, DiFrancesco v. Bullock, No. CV-17-66-BU-SEH (D. Mont. 
Aug. 31, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/ttwzjvo [https://perma.cc/GCG6-KSWF]; Angela Brandt, 
Lawsuit Alleges Montana Discriminates Against Drivers Too Poor To Pay Fines, INDEP. REC. 
(Sept. 6, 2017), https://helenair.com/news/crime-and-courts/lawsuit-alleges-montana-
discriminates-against-drivers-too-poor-to-pay/article_a5c72474-b911-562c-84c5-78b7ce4ec9e8.html 
[https://perma.cc/V6EN-WQ44]. 
130. Thomas v. Haslam, 329 F. Supp. 3d 475 (M.D. Tenn. 2018) (following class certification, 
finding that driver’s license revocation violated due process and equal protection rights), vacated 
as moot sub nom. Thomas v. Lee, 776 F. App’x 910 (6th Cir. 2019). 
131. Stinnie v. Holcomb, 396 F. Supp. 3d 653 (W.D. Va. 2019) (staying proceedings in light of 
a budget-amendment enactment eliminating driver’s license suspensions). The Department of 
Justice filed a statement of interest in this litigation. Statement of Interest of the United States, 
Stinnie, 396 F. Supp. 3d 653 (No. 3:16-CV-00044), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/909301/download [https://perma.cc/6L6P-3Y8F]. 
132. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Fuentes v. Benton County, No. 15-2-
02976-1 (Wash. Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/ 
files/field_document/fuentes_v._benton_county_-_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/WXG4-23K7].
 133. Haslam, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 494.
 134. Lee, 776 F. App’x at 911.
 135. Haslam, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 483. 
 136. Id. at 483–84.
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for doing so.137 Thus, “[court] debt leads to a license revocation; the 
revocation leads to another conviction, this time for driving on a 
revoked license; the new conviction creates more debt; and the cycle 
begins again, with the driver, who was already indigent, only deeper in 
. . . a debt spiral.”138 The causes and effects of this spiral are financial: 
people who cannot afford to pay an initial fine end up with more fines 
they cannot afford to pay. That said, the response to the ruling was 
telling: Tennessee amended its statute to provide additional process to 
determine indigency prerevocation, and in response, the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals vacated the lower court judgment as moot.139 
Whether that statutory change results in improved outcomes remains 
to be seen. 
What is the preferred judicial remedy for an unconstitutional 
driver’s license suspension scheme? One policy approach, as adopted 
in Tennessee140 and intended to address that constitutional problem, is 
to require judges to conduct an inquiry into ability to pay before 
imposing a fine or a consequence for failing to pay the fine.141 Thus, a 
person who refuses to pay a fine that is set at an affordable level would 
still receive a driver’s license suspension, while a person who cannot 
pay would not and might receive some alternative sanction. However, 
judges must conduct that inquiry carefully, and ability to pay must be 
defined in a realistic manner. Some states have adopted procedures, as 
well as judicial bench cards and checklists, to guide such ability-to-pay 
hearings.142 Brief hearings in traffic courts that have large dockets may 
not give judges good opportunities to fairly assess a person’s ability to 
 137. Id. at 484.
 138. Id. 
 139. Lee, 776 F. App’x at 911 (citing the enactment of 2019 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 438, which 
adopted an indigency exception to the state’s license suspension scheme).
 140. See id.
 141. BETH A. COLGAN, HAMILTON PROJECT, ADDRESSING MODERN DEBTORS’ PRISONS 
WITH GRADUATED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS THAT DEPEND ON ABILITY TO PAY 13 (2019). 
 142. See, e.g., NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE FAMILY COURT JUDGES, STATE JUSTICE INST.
& NAT’L JUVENILE DEF. CTR., ENSURING YOUNG PEOPLE ARE NOT CRIMINALIZED FOR 
POVERTY: BAIL, FEES, FINES, COSTS, AND RESTITUTION IN JUVENILE COURT (2018), 
https://njdc.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Bail-Fines-and-Fees-Bench-Card_Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S9NL-5JTH] (“This bench card . . . provides guidance for judges on how to 
exercise their discretion to alleviate harm and support youth on pathways to success.”); NAT’L 
TASK FORCE ON FINES, FEES & BAIL PRACTICES, LAWFUL COLLECTION OF LEGAL FINANCIAL 
OBLIGATIONS: A BENCH CARD FOR JUDGES (2017), https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/ 
articles/lawful-collection-of-legal-financial-obligations-a-bench-card-for-judges [https://perma.cc/
RW5N-MP4C] (setting guidelines for courts in sanctioning indigent defendants for nonpayment 
of court fines and fees). 
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2020] DRIVEN TO FAILURE 1621 
pay a fine.143 Payment schedules designed to accommodate people with 
limited ability to pay can use sliding scales grounded in actual income, 
with mechanisms for adjustment based on individual factors.144 Each of 
these approaches raise challenges in implementation. For example, 
litigants may not have ready access to detailed documentation 
concerning their income or resources; judges may need to rely on 
convenient proxies, such as public-assistance documentation.145 
One central limitation of such constitutional challenges is not only 
that they may take time and expense to litigate and that court orders 
must be enforced over time, but also that the focus of such litigation is 
necessarily narrow. Where federal constitutional doctrine focuses on 
the situation in which a person is criminally punished based on 
indigency, constitutional challenges have focused on people who 
cannot afford to pay—and fail to pay—fines and fees, resulting in loss 
of driving privileges. A class action was recently filed in North Carolina 
challenging FTC-related driver’s license suspensions on due process 
and equal protection grounds, among others.146 Such cases do not 
address FTA suspensions. However, our research suggests that it is 
much more important in states like North Carolina, in which FTA cases 
are far more numerous, to focus on those FTA cases. As a result, policy 
approaches that do not rely purely on litigation may be highly 
desirable. 
B. Better Understanding Failures to Appear
Although the bulk of driver’s license suspensions in North 
Carolina are denoted as FTAs, less attention has been paid to such 
cases as a matter of policy, and less is known about the causes of FTAs. 
One possibility is that people want to avoid interactions with the court 
system and law enforcement. Indeed, we do see a much larger 
overrepresentation of Latinx individuals with FTAs than FTCs (Table 
1)—a population that may avoid contact due to deportation concerns. 
However, logic suggests that while some may not show up to court for 
 143. See, e.g., Theresa Zhen, (Color)Blind Reform: How Ability-To-Pay Determinations Are 
Inadequate To Transform a Racialized System of Penal Debt, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
175, 201–03 (2019) (“The nature of the human condition is so nuanced that no finite set of 
questions can accurately determine a person’s past, present, and future circumstances.”).
144. Beth A. Colgan, Graduating Economic Sanctions According to Ability To Pay, 103 IOWA 
L. REV. 53, 74–96 (2017). 
 145. See id. at 61–65 (discussing how “to effectively capture and employ valid financial data”). 
146. Johnson v. Jessup, 381 F. Supp. 3d 619, 623 (M.D.N.C.) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ due 
process and equal protection claims), appeal filed, No. 19-1421 (4th Cir. Apr. 19, 2019). 
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problematic reasons, such as willful avoidance of court obligations, 
there are also potential financial and indigency-related causes for 
failing to appear. For example, a person may know they cannot afford 
to pay a fine and thus not go to court. Someone who cannot afford to 
take a day off work lest they lose their job or who cannot afford 
childcare also may not appear. Our regression results support this 
point: the effects of race and poverty are extremely similar between the 
population of those with an FTC and those with an FTA (Table 7). 
Additionally, given the huge number of FTAs in North Carolina, 
it may be that many suspensions are not due to intentional lawlessness 
but rather due to ignorance of the suspension in the first place. In North 
Carolina, residents are notified of their court dates and subsequent 
FTA by physical mail to the address in AOC’s database,147 unless they 
register for a text-based system that was established in late 2018.148 It is 
hard to know how many of the mail addresses are accurate, but there 
is evidence that quite a few addresses are inaccurate and will not 
receive mail addressed to the person in question.149 In our discussions 
with public defenders and policy advocates while conducting this 
research, many expressed doubt that addresses are correct.150 If that is 
a contributor to the problem, then a policy solution would be to 
improve notification systems by relying on texts or more up-to-date 
address information. If instead people fail to appear because of 
practical challenges tied to lack of transportation, then court-
supported transportation solutions may be needed.
Courts treat FTAs and FTCs differently based on constitutional 
doctrine that has focused on punishments disproportionately imposed 
on those who cannot pay—and in some cases that focus may be 
warranted. However, there also exists a strong possibility that a similar 
cause—financial hardship—underlies both charges. More information 
147. Karima Modjadidi, Brandon L. Garrett & William Crozier, Undeliverable: Suspended 
Driver’s Licenses and the Problem of Notice, UCLA CRIM. JUST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) 
(manuscript at 4–5), https://tinyurl.com/tgbfmur [https://perma.cc/Y2WB-TU6D]. 
148. North Carolina has initiated a text-based court notification system. Press Release, N.C. 
Judicial Branch, Court Date Notifications and Reminders for Criminal Cases Now Available Via 
Text and Email (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.nccourts.gov/news/tag/press-release/court-date-
notifications-and-reminders-for-criminal-cases-now-available-via-text-and-email [https://perma.cc/
VT5Q-FW4D].
149. Modjadidi, Garrett & Crozier, supra note 147, at 4 (describing a survey in Wake County, 
North Carolina, of persons with active driver’s license suspensions and finding that over one-third 
had mail returned). 
150. Email from Emily E. Mistr, Wake Cty. Pub. Def. Office, to the authors (Sept. 28, 2019) 
(on file with authors). 
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2020] DRIVEN TO FAILURE 1623 
on the causes of FTAs and the extent of overlap between the causes of 
FTAs and FTCs is necessary to better design policy responding to this 
problem. If for some groups of people, FTCs and FTAs are a 
distinction without a difference, policy interventions should be 
addressed to both groups and both legal mechanisms that result in 
driver’s license suspensions. 
C. Financial Incentives and Policy 
It is possible that the wide breadth of suspensions in North 
Carolina are not based directly on racial and economic factors, but 
instead enforcement due to budgetary considerations. Interestingly, 
such policies may not be as effective as one might suspect at raising 
revenue; after all, many indigent people cannot pay, and some 
jurisdictions spend more trying to collect than they ultimately 
recover.151 Previous work has explored how policing, particularly 
targeted at vulnerable, poor communities, can help turn a profit for 
local government and police agencies.152 Perhaps the most famous 
example is Ferguson, Missouri, in which citizens who cannot pay fines 
for crimes—the same fines that underlie the suspensions we describe 
here—were imprisoned and their debt sold by the city to private 
collection companies.153 So common was this practice that court fines 
and fees were Ferguson’s second-largest source of income in 2013.154 
Unlike in Missouri, court fines and fees do not directly result in 
additional funding for local police agencies or governments in North 
Carolina, but they are, in part, nevertheless directed to local 
government. Instead, North Carolina has long adopted a 
constitutionally unified court system, in which court salaries and 
operational costs are paid via state funds.155 Dating back to the 1875 
state constitution, court fines are directed to a state fund that supports 
 151. MATTHEW MENENDEZ, MICHAEL F. CROWLEY, LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN & NOAH 
ATCHISON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE STEEP COSTS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES AND 
FINES 5 (2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/steep-costs-criminal-
justice-fees-and-fines [https://perma.cc/VS5K-DELX]. 
152. Michael D. Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann, Political Economy at Any Speed: What 
Determines Traffic Citations?, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 509, 509 (2009).
 153. DOJ INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 79, at 2–6. 
 154. Policing and Profit, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1723, 1724 (2015). 
 155. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 20 (“The General Assembly shall provide for the establishment 
of a schedule of court fees and costs which shall be uniform throughout the State within each 
division of the General Court of Justice. The operating expenses of the judicial department . . . 
shall be paid from State funds.”).
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public schools.156 However, the funds are retained by the county in 
which the fines are imposed, and localities may offset the funds they 
receive for schools.157 Court costs are a bit more complicated, and while 
they do sometimes go to a state fund that supports court agencies, they 
are also distributed to other state groups and funds not directly 
involved in court administration.158 Further, a recent analysis of fines 
and forfeitures in California city governments found that budgetary 
considerations and public-safety factors did not predict reliance on 
fines and forfeitures.159 Rather, racial composition of both the 
population and the police force did.160 However, a study of North 
Carolina traffic tickets found that, from 1990 to 2003, more traffic 
infractions were issued in the year following a decline in revenue—and 
that the growth did not stall once revenue increased.161 This suggests 
that despite the fine structure in North Carolina, there may be a 
“profitable policing” motive underlying ticketing and, by extension, 
these suspensions. 
Even if the goal is to secure payment of traffic fines statewide, it is 
unclear how effective suspensions are as a deterrent against 
nonpayment of traffic fines. In North Carolina, at least 25 percent of 
people with a suspended license have a DWLR charge (Table 2)—but 
this is based just on DWLR data from 2013–2017, so the total is likely 
156. David M. Lawrence, Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures: An Historical and Comparative 
Analysis, 65 N.C. L. REV. 49, 57–58 (1986). The state constitution provides for the allocation of 
these funds directly to local government: 
[A]ll moneys, stocks, bonds, and other property belonging to a county school fund, and 
the clear proceeds of all penalties and forfeitures and of all fines collected in the several 
counties for any breach of the penal laws of the State, shall belong to and remain in the 
several counties, and shall be faithfully appropriated and used exclusively for 
maintaining free public schools. 
N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 7. 
 157. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 7. 
 158. Shea Denning, We Are NOT Ferguson, N.C. CRIM. L. (Apr. 16, 2015, 11:13 AM), 
https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/we-are-not-ferguson [https://perma.cc/8V5U-Q2RK]; see also
2017 Court Costs, N.C. JUD. BRANCH (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.nccourts.gov/documents/ 
publications/2017-court-costs [https://perma.cc/4UNT-ZBFS] (providing a breakdown of court 
costs). 
159. Akheil Singla, Charlotte Kirschner & Samuel B. Stone, Race, Representation, and 
Revenue: Reliance on Fines and Forfeitures in City Governments, URB. AFF. REV. ONLINEFIRST,
Mar. 2019, at 1, 3, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1078087419834632 
[https://perma.cc/EZB5-DTJP].
 160. Id.
161. Thomas A. Garrett & Gary A. Wagner, Red Ink in the Rearview Mirror: Local Fiscal 
Conditions and the Issuance of Traffic Tickets, 52 J.L. & ECON. 71, 72 (2009). 
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be far larger,162 and these are only the drivers who had been pulled over 
after the initial suspension. People continue to drive without their 
license, suggesting that the risk of a DWLR is outweighed by the costs 
of losing mobility. Given the widespread financial and personal costs 
of not driving, such decision-making is understandable. Because of the 
overrepresentation of people of color and the strong correlation 
between suspensions and poverty, this Article’s findings reiterate what 
has been found in other states: these policies disproportionately affect 
vulnerable and minority communities. 
D. Legislative Efforts 
Legislative approaches have the benefit of not depending on 
implementation of a decree entered in litigation. In recent years, 
several states have adopted laws removing automatic driver’s license 
suspension provisions. In response to growing awareness of the costs 
of driver’s license suspensions, many jurisdictions have reconsidered 
the use of laws requiring suspensions for non-driving-related offenses, 
including through statutes, administrative actions, and government 
programs. In 2016, the Department of Justice recommended in a Dear 
Colleague Letter that state and local courts avoid using suspension as 
a debt-collection tool.163 California eliminated such suspensions by 
statute in 2017, as noted.164 Washington, D.C., has enacted legislation 
to end driver’s license suspension for failure to pay fines and fees,165 as 
162. We have made a request to the North Carolina AOC for all DWLR data, going back 
farther in time, but as of this writing have not yet received these data. 
163. Dear Colleague Letter, Vanita Gupta & Lisa Foster, Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Fines and Fees in State and Local Courts 7 n.9 (Mar. 14, 2016), 
https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/content/uploads/2018/11/Dear-Colleague-letter.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/2YJ2-8S5B]. DOJ relied in part on research studies regarding the societal impact of 
these laws. The DOJ letter cited to a study of suspended drivers in New Jersey, which found that 
42 percent of people lost their jobs as a result of the driver’s license suspension, that 45 percent 
could not find another job, and that this had the greatest impact on seniors and low-income 
individuals. Id. at 7 n.8 (citing ALAN M. VOORHEES TRANSP. CTR. & N.J. MOTOR VEHICLE 
COMM’N, MOTOR VEHICLES AFFORDABILITY AND FAIRNESS TASK FORCE: FINAL REPORT xii 
(2006), https://www.state.nj.us/mvc/pdf/about/AFTF_final_02.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6V4-
EZUV]).
 164. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
165. Traffic and Parking Ticket Penalty Amendment Act of 2018, 65 D.C. Reg. 9546 (Sept. 
14, 2018). 
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has Maine.166 Missouri,167 Washington,168 and Vermont169 have limited 
the circumstances in which license suspension can occur and have 
capped suspension time periods. Legislation to end suspensions for 
non-driving-related offenses is presently under consideration in New 
York.170 
The “Next Step Act” legislation introduced in North Carolina in 
2019 would limit suspensions to one year for failure-to-pay cases.171 The 
Act would require that, for people facing suspensions for a failure to 
pay, “there [be] a court finding at sentencing that the person is able to 
pay and the license should be suspended if the person fails to pay.”172 
Further, even for such suspensions, the suspension would be limited to 
twelve months.173 This legislation would provide improved process and 
a defined suspension period for FTC cases. However, the Act would 
not address the problems with FTAs, making it an incomplete response 
to the overall body of suspensions, the vast majority of which, as 
described, consist of FTAs. Nor would the legislation be retroactive; its 
text does not speak to any such retroactive application, and as a result, 
it would not affect the large numbers of current suspensions. 
This retroactivity problem highlights a challenge nationally, where 
millions of adult drivers have suspensions. Even the enactment of more 
comprehensive legislation, which can alter fines-and-fees practices 
statewide, may not address how to restore driving privileges and 
address debt for millions of individuals affected by the statutes and 
practices that have been in place in the past. Indeed, even retroactive 
legislation would still require individuals to return to the DMV and 
reapply for a license. To provide individuals with notice to do so may 
be a challenge, given problems with outdated address information. Our 
research suggests that localized, service-oriented efforts may be 
166. An Act Regarding Driver’s License Suspensions for Nondriving-Related Violations, 
2018 Me. Laws ch. 462. 
 167. MO. REV. STAT. § 302.341 (2019) (limiting the scope of driver’s license suspensions for 
nonpayment to nonminor moving traffic violations). 
 168. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.289 (2019) (ending suspension of driver’s licenses for 
nonpayment of fines or fees for nonmoving traffic violations). 
 169. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 1109 (2019) (limiting the time period of driver’s license 
suspension to thirty days). 
170. Assemb. B. 7463A, 2019–2020 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); S.B. 5348A, 2019–2020 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019). 
171. Next Step Act, H.B. 988, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2019). 
 172. Id. § 1(a) (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-24.1(a)(2)). 
 173. Id. (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-24.1(b)(5)). 
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needed to inform individuals of their rights and assist them in restoring 
driving privileges. 
E. Local Policy Efforts 
Localized efforts have focused on providing services to assist 
individuals with restoring their rights, even if fines have been waived 
and their privileges restored. Such efforts may be very important 
because, as we have described, individuals with suspended licenses 
often do not appear in court and may not be easy to reach. They may 
distrust courts, be wary of legal notices, and fear that they cannot pay 
fees to restore rights or fear consequences of participation in legal 
processes. For those reasons, local efforts have focused on informing 
people with suspended driver’s licenses of their ability to restore 
licenses and providing resources to assist them in that process.174 
Several states have programs designed to help people resolve overdue 
payment of fines or cure FTAs.175 In Durham, North Carolina, as part 
of a pilot program, the Durham Expungement and Restoration 
(“DEAR”) program, the district attorney dismissed 2,500 charges for 
eligible individuals with suspended driver’s licenses in June 2018 and 
dismissed another six hundred cases in January 2019, with additional 
dismissal dockets conducted every two weeks.176 For context, Durham 
 174. KATHERINE FITZGERALD & MICHAEL GRISWOLD, MECKLENBURG COUNTY DRIVER 
LICENSE RESTORATION CLINIC PILOT SUMMARY 3–5 (2016), 
https://www.mecknc.gov/CriminalJusticeServices/Documents/Other%20Publications/DLRC%2 
0Statistical%20Summary_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/24FM-NMWH]; Katherine Kershaw, Law 
Students Help with Driver’s License Restoration and Immigration over Spring Break, UNC-
CHAPEL HILL U. NEWS (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.unc.edu/posts/2018/03/23/pro-bono-
students-help-with-drivers-license-restoration-and-immigration-over-spring-break 
[https://perma.cc/T985-7A4D]; Kristen Powers, Clean Slate Success in Durham, SOUTHERN 
COALITION FOR SOC. JUST. (May 1, 2014), https://www.southerncoalition.org/clean-slate-success-
durham [https://perma.cc/MUJ9-DEW7]; Greensboro Driver’s License Restoration Clinic, N.C.
PRO BONO RESOURCE CTR., https://ncprobono.org/volunteergreensboro 
[https://perma.cc/VD3L-SLQF]. 
 175. See, e.g., HELENA GARDNER, DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSIONS AND DRIVING WITH A 
LICENSE SUSPENDED IN VERMONT: BACKGROUND 2 (2016), 
https://legislature.vermont.gov/Documents/2016/WorkGroups/House%20Judiciary/Bills/H.571/ 
W~Helena%20Gardner~License%20Suspensions%20in%20Vermont~1-7-2016.pdf [https://
perma.cc/SWK4-36RF] (Vermont); Moyer, supra note 91 (Charlottesville, Virginia); CAP – 
Compliance Assistance Program, CITY OF PHX., https://www.phoenix.gov/court/cap 
[https://perma.cc/K4YH-VBWM] (Phoenix, Arizona); Relicensing Program, SPOKANE CITY, 
https://my.spokanecity.org/courts/prosecutor/relicensing [https://perma.cc/9G5X-4VX7]
(Spokane, Washington).
 176. Derrick Lewis, Durham DA Dismisses Traffic Charges for 500 People, CBS17.COM (July 
1, 2018, 9:36 PM), https://www.cbs17.com/news/local-news/durham-county-news/durham-da-
dismisses-traffic-charges-for-500-people [https://perma.cc/CST9-P7S6]; Sarah Willets, Durham 
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County had 40,500 suspensions,177 which may not include the 2,500 
dismissals in 2018 if they were resolved quickly. The program, a 
collaboration between the city of Durham, the court, the North 
Carolina Justice Center, Legal Aid, local law schools, and others, is
housed in an office at the courthouse, and it provides free help to 
clients with driver’s license restoration, expungements, and certificates 
of relief.178 Thus, one additional local response to the growing numbers 
of these suspensions would be for prosecutors to use their discretion to 
dismiss such charges on a larger scale. Even such an approach, 
however, requires efforts to inform people of that relief, and then work 
with them to formally restore driving privileges through the state 
DMV. 
F. Future Directions in Addressing Driver’s License Suspensions 
This Article provides a largely descriptive analysis that is not 
intended to advocate for any particular policy or legislative solutions. 
However, it has emphasized in its discussion of policy approaches that 
any response to these suspensions, which currently affect millions of 
people across the country, will likely need to be multifaceted in any 
jurisdiction. As this Article shows, many individuals have either FTAs 
or FTCs, and some have both. Although some changes may be effective 
in reducing FTC suspensions, such as litigation approaches or efforts 
requiring judges to conduct an ability-to-pay inquiry, FTAs are likely 
much more challenging because, logically, one cannot waive fees in 
court if a person does not appear in court. Legislative approaches could 
address such FTAs. More structural solutions to court processes, such 
as facilitating transportation to court or online payment of fines, based 
on ability to pay, might also be successful. We have separately 
documented a problem that individuals may fail to receive notice by 
mail of driver’s license suspensions; still additional policy should be 
directed toward ensuring actual notice of these serious outcomes.179 
Given the large number of suspensions, changing practices or law 
going forward will not address the large number of existing 
suspensions, for which local efforts and social-services approaches may 
County Dismisses Hundreds of Traffic Fines as Part of a License Restoration Effort, INDY WEEK
(Jan. 15, 2019, 2:12 PM), https://indyweek.com/news/durham/durham-county-dismisses-
hundreds-of-traffic-fines [https://perma.cc/8HYU-MSE3]. 
 177. See infra Appendix B. 
 178. Willets, supra note 176. 
 179. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
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be needed. Further, even if a change is made retroactive or old charges 
are dismissed by prosecutors, comprehensively notifying those affected 
would itself be a challenging process. For the same reasons that 
individuals who are indigent faced difficulty appearing in traffic court, 
they may face difficulties with the DMV process for restoring a license, 
which would involve further applications, waiting, and fees. Service-
oriented restoration efforts are therefore an important component of 
any effort to reduce driver’s license suspensions in any community. 
Such restoration efforts would require tailoring to the financially 
burdened, primarily minority populations that make up the majority of 
North Carolina citizens with suspended licenses. 
Successful reform also requires a better understanding of the 
causes of driver’s license suspensions, population-level characteristics 
of those with suspended licenses, and the impact of having a suspended 
license on individuals’ lives. Each of those issues will be the subject of 
further empirical research. Though illustrative, these data do not 
complete the entire picture of driver’s license suspensions. It is worth 
a reminder that these data are all correlational, preventing causal 
inferences—for example, that poverty causes higher rates of license 
suspensions. Further, because data were analyzed at an aggregate, 
county level, we cannot draw conclusions about individual-level factors 
for suspensions, such as whether being black puts you at a higher risk 
for having an active suspension. But even though the data do paint a 
clear picture of racial disparity in suspensions and the analyses point to 
a complicated race–poverty interaction, they do not provide an 
underlying mechanism or cause. 
We note that driving distances to jobs have increased over the past 
two decades, and there is evidence that residents of higher-poverty 
neighborhoods have experienced even greater declines in job 
proximity.180 Future research should further examine not only the 
connection between race, poverty rates, and driver’s license 
suspensions, but also the geography of driver’s license suspension. 
This Article’s findings and limitations in the data and analyses 
point to further areas of research. Perhaps the most important missing 
piece here are analyses at the individual, rather than county-year, level. 
Data that include cured and active suspensions, as well as economic 
 180. ELIZABETH KNEEBONE & NATALIE HOLMES, METRO. POLICY PROGRAM AT 
BROOKINGS, THE GROWING DISTANCE BETWEEN PEOPLE AND JOBS IN METROPOLITAN 
AMERICA 1 (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Srvy_ 
JobsProximity.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WPA-4CJY]. 
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data such as employment and income, would more clearly reveal any 
relationship between race, poverty, and suspension status. Specifically, 
how these factors predict whether a suspension is active or cured would 
illustrate the effectiveness of suspensions as debt-collection tools and 
individual-level risk factors for remaining suspended.181 
Another approach for analyzing such data would be a more in-
depth analysis of county-level factors that predict the number of 
suspensions. Here, because driver’s license suspension policies in 
North Carolina are statewide, we chose to assign county-year as a 
random effect to analyze statewide trends. However, that random 
effect naturally encompasses a great deal of variation between 
counties. County-level variation in population density, policing, 
neighborhood and racial dispersion, court and police resources, 
employment, public transportation, and commute times all likely 
contribute to variation in how suspensions are enforced. Examination 
of these factors may yield trends that suggest more tailored outcomes 
and needed policy reforms for each county. 
Beyond the status of suspensions, we need further data on how 
suspensions affect people’s day-to-day lives. Although previous reports 
have found people suffer from lost jobs, financial difficulties, and 
mounting, unpayable debts,182 the ability to quantify these effects and 
directly link them to individual risk factors would paint a clearer 
picture of the true effect of these suspension policies. Interview and 
survey methods could explore why people do not appear in court or 
pay their fines, providing empirical evidence for both the causes and 
effects of suspended driver’s licenses. 
CONCLUSION
This Article reviews the extant empirical literature on driver’s 
license suspensions and then examines driver’s license suspension data 
from North Carolina. We find that there are 1,225,000 active driver’s 
license suspensions in North Carolina with 827,000 for failure to 
appear, 263,000 for failure to comply, and 135,000 for both. This 
constitutes about 15 percent of all adult drivers in the state. We 
describe the demographics of the people subject to active suspensions 
and examine variation in county-level imposition of such suspensions. 
181. We are presently pursuing such an analysis of North Carolina FTC data. 
 182. See, e.g., ALEX BENDER ET AL., supra note 92, at 6–8; see also CARNEGIE, IMPACTS AND 
FAIRNESS STUDY, supra note 86, at 3, 8. 
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We detail how neither the volume of traffic stops nor the size of traffic 
court dockets can explain the observed disparities. We also report data 
on further prosecution for driving with a revoked license in North 
Carolina. 
We set out a range of policy responses to these driver’s license 
suspensions. We suggest that driver’s license suspensions for non-
driving-related reasons do not accomplish the policy goal of ensuring 
payment of fines and fees but rather exacerbate poverty and impose 
negative economic consequences on individuals and communities. 
However, we suggest that constitutional challenges are an incomplete 
response since they only focus on punishments directed at those unable 
to pay fees, and therefore the remedies may focus solely on ability-to-
pay hearings and not on failures to appear. Failures to appear in court 
are a central part of the policy problem identified, but responses to 
nonappearance may be different, in part because they may implicate 
different underlying causes, including insufficient methods for 
notifications from the court and lack or loss of access to transportation. 
What can be done to address this problem? The most 
straightforward path, adopted in several states in recent years, would 
be to eliminate driver’s license suspension as an “incentive” for 
appearing in court and paying fines. Ideally, jurisdictions should do so 
retroactively, clearing dated suspensions. Barring a jurisdiction-wide 
solution, states should improve communication, such as by issuing 
notices in a method other than by mail and being proactive regarding 
failed communication. States should make efforts to reduce the 
number of suspensions put in place by having more mechanisms for 
assessing ability to pay at hearings and consideration of individual 
circumstances. In addition, states can limit the impact of suspensions, 
including by capping the duration of such suspensions. States should 
also support restoration efforts, including by actively notifying 
suspended drivers and/or automatically restoring driving privileges. As 
described, although litigation or legislation can prospectively address 
both FTC and FTA cases statewide, such legal changes may not 
effectively retrospectively address the millions of prior suspensions 
that exist in many states, like North Carolina. Social services at the 
local level may assist individuals to restore driving privileges. 
It is a comparatively recent phenomenon that states suspend 
millions of adult drivers’ privileges indefinitely for failure to pay traffic 
tickets and other non-driving-related reasons. The story this Article 
tells is one of unintended consequences: federal funding tied to driver’s 
license suspension as a condition of receipt of highway and other funds 
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in order to recoup child support and punish drug offenders. Yet, 
driver’s license suspensions exploded as states like North Carolina 
incorporated suspension data into electronic court-records systems and 
turned temporary suspensions into indefinite ones that can persist for 
years and even decades. What began as a system for collecting court 
debt may instead reinforce poverty. The resulting problem of driver’s 
licenses suspension is so large scale and deep rooted that it will require 
a multifaceted policy response. Given the paucity of prior research and 
the complexity of the problem, this Article emphasizes that important 
questions remain for future research that could inform constitutional 
litigation, local restoration efforts, dismissals of charges, and legislative 
efforts to restore licenses and end the suspension of driver’s licenses 
for non-driving-related traffic offenses. Constitutional challenges to 
driver’s license suspensions, legislative efforts, and community efforts 
have all enjoyed growing success in recent years. The story of driver’s 
license suspension in North Carolina can hopefully inform the 
sustained efforts that will be required to undo large-scale driver’s 
license suspension in the United States. 
 
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Appendix A: Modeling Explanation, Tests, and Output 
Variable Description Source
Count of traffic stops in a county, per year
Count of traffic cases in a county, per year
Count of 16yo+ whites below poverty line in a 
county, per year 
Count of 16yo+ blacks below poverty line in a 
county, per year 
Count of 16yo+ whites above poverty line in a 
county, per year 
Count of 16yo+ blacks above poverty line in a 
county, per year 
County population, per year 
Individuals with only an FTC 
Individuals with only an FTA 
Individuals with an FTC & FTA 
Traffic stops 
Traffic cases 
Whites below poverty
Blacks below poverty 
Whites above poverty 
Whites below poverty
Population 
FTC Suspensions 
FTA Suspensions 
Both Suspensions 
NC State Bureau of 
Investigation 
AOC (via Charlotte 
Observer) 
US Census Website 
US Census Website 
US Census Website 
US Census Website 
US Census Website 
NC AOC 
NC AOC 
NC AOC 
Note: All predictors (but not outcome variables) were mean-centered for analysis. 
 
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FTC Model 1 FTC Model 2
Predictors Estimates CI p Estimates CI p
(Intercept) 1847.61 1450.39 – <0.001 1615.02 1191.60 – <0.001
2244.83 2038.44 
Stops -0.02 -0.04 – 0.00 0.088 
Traffic Cases -0.09 -0.12 – -0.07 <0.001
Whites Below -0.17 -0.29 – -0.06 0.004
Blacks Below 0.50 0.32 – 0.67 <0.001
Blacks Above -0.20 -0.28 – -0.12 <0.001
Whites
Above 
-0.01 -0.07 – 0.04 0.605 
Population 0.05 0.02 – 0.09 0.001
0.15 0.08 – 
0.22 
<0.001
0.04 0.01 – 
0.06 
0.002
0.19 0.13 – 
0.24 
<0.001
0.09 0.05 – 
0.13 
<0.001
-0.05 -0.08 – 
-0.03 
<0.001
Random Effects
2 263406.73 463761.25 
00 2557082.79 County 3310516.65 County 
44944.08 Year 103890.28 Year 
ICC 0.89 County 0.85 County 
0.02 Year 0.03 Year 
Observations 352 800 
Marginal R2 / 
Conditional 
R2 
0.684 / 0.971 0.694 / 0.963 
Note: Predictors are bolded when significant at the p < 0.05 level. 
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2020] DRIVEN TO FAILURE 1635 
FTA Model 1 FTA Model 2
Predictors Estimates CI p Estimates CI p
(Intercept) 6642.95 5063.11 – <0.001 6311.28 4887.35 – <0.001
8222.79 7735.21 
Stops 0.01 -0.00 – 0.02 0.224 
Traffic Cases -0.07 -0.09 – -0.05 <0.001
Whites Below 0.05 -0.05 – 0.14 0.337 
Blacks Below 0.43 0.29 – 0.57 <0.001
Blacks Above 0.39 0.31 – 0.47 <0.001
Whites
Above 
0.15 0.09 – 0.22 <0.001
Population -0.07 -0.11 – -0.04 <0.001
0.34 0.27 – 
0.41 
<0.001
0.05 0.03 – 
0.07 
<0.001
0.58 0.52 – 
0.65 
<0.001
0.21 0.16 – 
0.25 
<0.001
-0.13 -0.16 – 
-0.10 
<0.001
Random Effects
2 87948.85 311674.05 
00 56954551.57 County 50060818.96 County 
85445.03 Year 214523.87 Year 
ICC 1.00 County 0.99 County 
0.00 Year 0.00 Year 
Observations 352 800 
Marginal R2 / 
Conditional 
R2 
0.637 / 0.999 0.641 / 0.998 
Note: Predictors are bolded when significant at the p < 0.05 level. 
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Both Model 1 Both Model 2
Predictors Estimates CI p Estimates CI p
(Intercept) 1122.77 852.66 – <0.001 1025.4 738.70 – <0.001
1392.89 5 1312.21 
Stops -0.00 -0.01 – 0.00 0.550 
Traffic Cases -0.03 -0.04 – -0.02 <0.001
Whites Below -0.05 -0.09 – -0.01 0.009
Blacks Below 0.17 0.11 – 0.22 <0.001
Blacks Above -0.05 -0.09 – -0.02 0.001
Whites
Above 
0.01 -0.01 – 0.04 0.335 
Population 0.01 -0.00 – 0.03 0.095 
0.11 0.08 – 0.13 <0.001
0.02 0.01 – 0.03 <0.001
0.08 0.06 – 0.10 <0.001
0.06 0.04 – 0.07 <0.001
-0.03 -0.04 – -0.02 <0.001
Random Effects
2 18801.21 48630.78 
00 1499229.04 County 1956058.46 County 
9196.14 Year 14273.95 Year 
ICC 0.98 County 0.97 County 
0.01 Year 0.01 Year 
Observations 352 800 
Marginal R2 / 
Conditional 
R2 
0.607 / 0.995 0.654 / 0.992 
Note: Predictors are bolded when significant at the p < 0.05 level.
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Appendix B: North Carolina Driver’s License Suspension Statistics by 
County 

	


	

			 	
  	
	
 
1638 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1585 

	


	

			 	
  	
	
 
2020] DRIVEN TO FAILURE 1639 

	


	

			 	
  	
	
 
1640 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1585 

	


	

			 	
  	
	
 
2020] DRIVEN TO FAILURE 1641 
